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## CONTENTS

- Between the Functional and the Essential: European Perceptions & Domestic Choices in the Framework of Contemporary EU-Turkish Relations.....** 4-18  
*Sotiris Serbos*
- Children’s Educational and Occupational Aspirations in Urban Nigeria: Implications for Policy Development.....** 19-31  
*Dimeji Togunde*
- Bargaining Priorities in the New Economy: A survey of Malaysian Employee Unions.....** 32-42  
*Raduan Che Rose, Naresh Kumar and Harris Gani*
- Motivation and Productivity: Study of Civil Servants in Rivers State, Nigeria.....** 43-55  
*Austin O. Oparanma*
- Reform for Whom? An Evaluation Over the Health Sector in Turkey.....** 56-66  
*İpek Özkal Sayan*
- Bosnia’s ‘Jihad’ and the Development of Al Qaida: Past, Present, and Future.....** 67-81  
*David H. Gray and Fred A. Tafoya*

# **Between the Functional and the Essential: European Perceptions & Domestic Choices in the Framework of Contemporary EU-Turkish Relations**

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## **Abstract**

The aim of the paper is to present the fundamental structural weaknesses and challenges (political, security, economic, social & cultural) that continue to shape the frame of analysis for contemporary EU-Turkish relations and have blocked the opportunity of cultivating a more durable blend of political and social interaction along with positive feedback between the two sides (Turkey and the EU), in order to properly address and eventually resolve the ongoing problems and difficulties which dominate the environment of the pre-accession process. Apart from the lack of mutual commitment and credibility which consist of an endogenous feature, diachronically embedded in the historical course of EU-Turkish relations, the analysis will focus to both the Turkish (i.e. the context and limits of Europeanization, artificial reforms vs. consolidation of democracy, logic of appropriateness vs. logic of effect, secular centre and Islamic periphery vs. Turkish-Islamic synthesis) and the European level (i.e. the pure intergovernmental nature of Turkey's candidacy, the absence of a coherent strategy and political commitment towards Turkey, the operational multi-level approach through the co-existence of divergent and often conflicting national interests and policies adopted vis-à-vis Turkey –resulting in decisions taken at the lowest common denominator-), in order to highlight the asymmetric and troubled character of this relationship.

***“The main significance of this event is to underscore that Turkey is a part of Europe. This is not a simple restatement of historical and geographical facts, but the contemporary way of confirming a reality that goes much beyond. It is the legacy of Atatürk’s strong character and the Western reforms that he firmly established in Turkey in every aspect of life. There has not been another example of this in the history of Europe’s cultural and political expansion.”***

(Statement delivered by the President of the European Commission Walter Hallstein during the signing ceremony of the Ankara Agreement in September 1963)

## **Introduction**

The choice for Turkey's Westernization and European orientation path, derives both from a deep-rooted state tradition, which actually precedes the establishment of the Republic of Turkey itself, and a careful and realist perception of Turkish national interests and how these could be better served (search for national –internal and external- security, perseverance of secularism, securing modernization and economic development, ideological accomplishment). Taking into consideration the evolutionary nature and dynamic processes that govern the complexus of relations between Turkey and Europe/European Communities, the actual concept of Europeanization “has been swept along –through the passing of two hundred years-, from the various shake up of the reality itself, both European and Ottoman-

Turkish. There were and there still are many and different “*Europe-s*” many and different “*Turkey-s*” and multiple patterns of interaction with one another”<sup>1</sup>.

Until the end of the decade of 1990, the inability of the EU to act as a driving political force towards Turkey in relation to the structure and the way of organisation and function of the Turkish state rendered unfeasible the complete -or partial- compliance of the former with the required adaptations to the European model. With regard to the engagement of the EU and the effectiveness of its policies against Turkey, these have been characterized as contradictory to and incoherent with the Turkish reality, particularly when they are contrasted with the corresponding policies that were applied to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs)<sup>2</sup>. In the case of Turkey, the intergovernmental processes that were followed in combination with the decision-making that was adopted by the member states in the lowest common denominator because of diverging and conflicting national interests and perceptions, led to the absence of a concrete strategy towards Turkey as well as to a deeply rooted political engagement towards it, and in consequence to the low consolidation ability and anchoring capacity of the EU to commit and “to bound” Turkey to a cohesive course of progressive convergence with the *acquis*.

The main point that should be mentioned regarding the analysis of EC/EU-Turkey integration process and the conceptualization of the EU as a civilian power towards Turkey is that an anchor/credibility dilemma (which reflects two tendencies working at cross-purposes) has recurrently characterized the EC/EU Turkey relations due to both the former’s insufficient and mismanaged anchoring capacity and the latter’s non-credible political and policy commitments<sup>3</sup>. On the one hand, mainly the way of interaction and linkage among member states’ national interests and the institutionally complex decision-making system were the primary factors that limited –up to 1999- the EC/EU’s capacity as a regional civilian power to undertake clear and well-defined commitments along with shaping a coherent strategy to progressively anchor Turkey to the requirements of European integration (such as offering a membership perspective and/or impose sanctions with a view to anchor Turkey’s convergence towards European standards and criteria). On the other hand, this limited European anchoring capacity and the type of state-society interaction in Turkey have consequently induced Turkish politicians and policy makers (Kemalist elites) to engage in frequent deviations from the necessary economic and mainly political reforms required for convergence. Moreover, this dilemma has been exacerbated from time to time by the impact of the sub-optimal policy decisions on member states’ national expectations and self-interests at the EC/EU level and on societal expectations in Turkey<sup>4</sup>. In light of the above and for more than four decades, discretion, non-transparency, temporization, ambivalence and constructive ambiguity have been perpetual characteristics of EC/EU-Turkey relations. According to that analysis a conclusion can be drawn that in the early 1960s the European Community accepted with certain superficiality (i.e. by easily granting political promises) and without having developed a clear strategy regarding Turkey’s future accession prospects<sup>5</sup>.

## European Perceptions on Turkey’s Candidacy:

The study of the main factors behind the Turkish candidacy decision suggests that this decision, even though it was taken unanimously, was not taken very enthusiastically, was very much politically

<sup>1</sup> Stefanos Pasmazoglou, *Ευρώπη-Τουρκία, Αντανάκλασεις και Διαθλάσεις: Η Στρατηγική των Κεϊμένων*, [Europe and Turkey, Mirrors and Diffractions: Textual Strategies], vol. I, (Athens: Themelio, 1993), p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> Karen Smith, “The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality”, in Marise Cremona (ed.), *The Enlargement of the EU*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 132, Harun Arıkan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?*, (London: Ashgate, 2003), p. 144, Harun Arıkan, “A Lost Opportunity? A critique of the EU’s Human Rights Policy Towards Turkey”, *Mediterranean Politics*, (vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 2002), p. 43.

<sup>3</sup> See Mehmet Uğur, *The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 1-24.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Panos Kazakos, «Υψηλή Πολιτική» και Εσωτερικοί Παράγοντες στις Ελληνοτουρκικές Σχέσεις [High Politics and Domestic Factors in Greek-Turkish Relations], in Panos Kazakos, Panayotis Liargovas, Notis Marias, Constantina Botsiou, Katerina Polychronaki (eds.), *Η Ελλάδα και το Ευρωπαϊκό Μέλλον της Τουρκίας [Greece and Turkey’s European Future]*, (Athens: I. Sideris, 2001), p. 22.

motivated and rather national interest driven, in a framework constructed to serve special short-term (and several times conflicting) national interests. The result was the existence of a doubtful position and constructive ambiguity on behalf of the Union - that also constitutes a dominant characteristic of EU-Turkish relations - as the European leaders decided, despite any of their reservations that “they follow an intermediary way between integration (that will not take place at an early date) and the alienation of Turkey that would lead to the loss for Europe of a dynamic economic area and an important strategic partner”<sup>6</sup>.

In the domestic terrain of the Union’s member states, the decision was perceived in the frame of shaping national policies and of defending national interests, instead of an effort to approach and combine different opinions of member states for the course to be followed and for the future of European integration. This confirms with clarity the opinion that the enlargement policy of the EU continues to be discussed within the frame of intergovernmental cooperation with all the restrictions that this implies. Specifically, with regard to the large member states, the perceptions shaped in their domestic affairs are based on the formation of national strategies in relation to Turkey, as the economic entry in an emerging market of 70 million residents, the maintenance and further growth of bilateral ties with a country that is located in a geopolitical and geo-economic region of strategic importance, the continuous search for security and stability in the wider region of South-eastern Mediterranean, as well as the safeguarding of the structures of the EU in combination with the safeguarding of the whole set of values that were developed in the last fifty years inside the Union. Finally, the strong interest that the USA expresses for the reinforcement of the European orientation of Ankara constitutes to a certain extent a factor that shapes and determines the course of the EU-Turkish relations

Finally, as for the institutions of the EU, the perceptions are based on the possibility of creating an anchoring civilian power towards Turkey. Both the European Commission and the European Parliament have focused on defining clearer goals, setting control mechanisms and anchoring instruments for the EU to establish its self-determined rules and practices in the candidate countries, including Turkey.

A second point that should be made within this perceptual context is that despite the contractual and explicit decision to officially recognize Turkey as a fully-fledged candidate for EU membership, the issue of an eventual Turkish accession to the EU, does not seem to be widely approved by the EU electorate, the peoples of Europe. According to polls and surveys conducted by the European Commission from 1999 to 2005 and even though there was no majority support for the accession of any of the 13 negotiating candidates, the approval of Turkish membership would be much more difficult since it is least widespread and presents the lowest level of support (31.3% in favor vs 48.7% against)<sup>7</sup>, for religious and cultural differences, possible short and medium term economic and financial accession costs, geography, population and demographic trends and finally migration movements<sup>8</sup> (free movement of labor) amongst others. In most of the member states, the overwhelming perception is that decisions taken in Helsinki, symbolize a political gesture on behalf of the EU which signals only the start of a very perplexed and long-term process with many problems that have already arise during the interim period.

Towards this direction and with the aim of assisting Turkey’s approach towards Europe and its accession process, European public opinion and its elected representatives in the enhanced European Parliament, should be convinced for the significance and the appropriateness (in order to offer their assent) of a future decision that will enable Turkey’s full membership in the EU. Otherwise, European citizens will experience a continuous isolation from democratic processes with serious implications for

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<sup>6</sup> Panos Kazakos, «Οι Ευρωπαϊκές Προοπτικές της Τουρκίας» [Turkey’s European Prospects], in Panos Kazakos, Panayotis Liargovas, Notis Marias, Constantina Botsiou, Katerina Polychronaki (eds.), *Η Ελλάδα και το Ευρωπαϊκό Μέλλον της Τουρκίας [Greece and Turkey’s European Future]*, p. 276.

<sup>7</sup> European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer* (Report Numbers 51-64), DG Press and Communication, Brussels 1999-2005.

<sup>8</sup> Panos Kazakos,, *Το Αβέβαιο Μέλλον της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και η Τουρκία: Ιστορική Ταυτότητα, Θεσμοί και Υπερπέταση στην Ευρώπη [The European Union’s Doubtful Future and Turkey: Historic Identity, Institutions and Overstretching in Europe]*, (Athens: Papazisis, 2003), p. 50.

the social legitimacy of the future integration process. As public consent cannot be taken for granted, it should also be noted that although in the case of the EU's enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), "the decision to enlarge was more easily justified and legitimized in light of the moral, cultural and ethnic affinity that could be drawn between many of the member states and the majority of the CEECs (which made it easier for the pro-enlargement lobbies within the EU and aspirant states to convince the skeptical sections of their publics of the benefits and usefulness of the move)", between the EU and Turkey there is absence of any kind of strong cultural, moral and ethnic links<sup>9</sup>.

Through a European perspective, the analysis of Turkey's candidacy and its future accession, involves the difficulty of undertaking long term projections and the need for further in-depth studies of specific issues relevant for the conduct of accession negotiations. A number of difficulties and uncertainties are related to the range of issues (political and international, economic, social, institutional, external relations), raised by Turkey's possible accession including:<sup>10</sup>

- (1) The proper implementation of the revised Accession Partnership between Turkey and the EU.
- (2) The future European architecture (political, institutional, economic) as a result of the evolution of the Union's policies, the possible creation of new ones, and the degree of further or less deepening of the integration process that might follow as a result of these policies<sup>11</sup>.
- (3) The context of the EU's financial framework from 2014 to 2020 and the economic and structural developments that will occur both in Turkey and the EU during the next decade (economic development, employment, competitiveness), as well as exogenous factors, such as energy issues and the international economic environment at large.
- (4) The overall evolution of the enlargement policy of the EU taking into consideration the political, economic and institutional<sup>12</sup> implications from the enlargement process towards CEECs. Furthermore the EU's future absorption capacity to integrate a country with the size of Turkey without endangering the pace and the further deepening of the integration process will be taken into consideration<sup>13</sup>.
- (5) Relations between Greece and Turkey and the outcome of future negotiations for resolving the Cyprus issue.
- (6) The political and social reservations on behalf of conservative circles in the EU that reject any scenarios for Turkey's future accession.
- (7) Domestic political developments in member states of the EU (especially in the ones that preserve a crucial say over Turkey's European prospects) along with public opinion perceptions over Turkey's membership.
- (8) Future developments in and around Turkey's highly "sensitive" geostrategic environment<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> H. Tarik Oguzlu, "The Latest Turkish-Greek Détente: Instrumentalist Play for EU Membership, or Long-Term Institutional Cooperation?", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, (vol. 17, no. 2, July 2004), p. 339.

<sup>10</sup> For issues arising from Turkey's accession Commission of the European Communities see *Commission Staff Working Document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*, COM(2004) 656 final, Brussels, October 6 2004, SEC(2004) 1202, pp. 3-6.

<sup>11</sup> Depending on future developments at the European level (i.e. if the EU develops federal characteristics or on the contrary if the integration process suffers from spill-back, retrenchment effects).

<sup>12</sup> For issues regarding distribution of seats in the European Parliament and number of votes under the QMV system in the Council of the EU. For example by the year 2020, Turkey's population will be the largest one among the members states of the EU with almost 90 million citizens (Germany around 82, France and the UK around 64 and 63 millions respectively). "Special Report: Turkey and the EU", *Economist*, November 2004, p. 34, Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Staff Working Document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*, p. 6.

<sup>13</sup> For the issue of migration and its impact on social European level, see Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Staff Working Document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*, p. 5.

<sup>14</sup> In this context, special reference must be made to the concept of Turkey as a "pivotal state". Turkey fulfills all the requirements of a pivotal state: population, location, and economic and military potential. Its defining quality, though, is the potential to effect regional and international stability. Turkey's significance lies not only in its geostrategic value, but also in the destabilization and uncertainty problems that the (even remote) possibility of its decline might result to. The regional balance and for that reason the geostrategic value and role of Turkey depends and will depend on a number of factors, which seemingly would contribute – not evenly – to either enhancing or

In light of the above, it is also important to note that in the political and security front, with the Turkish candidacy decision, the EU has built on its civilian actorness both vis-à-vis Turkey by much more firmly anchoring the country to European vocation on a clearer contractual commitment basis and in the international system by orienting Turkey's geo-strategic weight to contribute to the EU's foreign and security policy<sup>15</sup>. Also the EU reinforced the special weight that -from the mid 1990s- assigns to developing an organized political space through the internationalization of norms and rules of the integration process<sup>16</sup>. In other words, the Union has demonstrated its determination not to act as an inward-oriented fortress. Instead it has displayed –at least in the beginning- the image of an outward-looking international actor which can act as magnet by using soft power instruments and political discipline to intervene and effectively contribute to managing and resolving long standing disputes (Greek-Turkish relations, the Cyprus issue)<sup>17</sup>. Furthermore the Balkan crisis and the recent Kosovo war have strengthened the point of view that only the effect and interplay of three variables (consolidation of democracy, strengthening economic interdependence, membership in international organizations like the EU and NATO), can decisively contribute to decreasing possibilities leading to regional conflicts.

## Turkey's Europeanization Process: Domestic Affairs and Elite Perceptions

### A) Kemalism and Europeanization

For decades Turkey wished accession to the EEC/EU, but the political and military Kemalist establishment of the country obstructed or denied to go ahead with the implementation of deep and sensitive reforms. On the contrary, it demanded to enter the Union immutable, trying to exploit the advantages of the country's geopolitical position, so that it would achieve "relaxation" of the Copenhagen criteria, being unable at the same time to comprehend the political content and the dynamics of the process of European integration (as these were developed since the beginning of the 1990s and henceforth). As a state that delayed for long a number of essential changes, it is now called to convince for the reliability of its policies, something that can only happen in the depth of time.

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diminishing Turkey's role in regional and world politics, in the framework of the US foreign policy and security interests. The most important of these factors include Turkey's relations with US and its position in the wider security strategic planning of Washington; the relations between USA/West and Iraq (and Iran); the relations between the West and Russia as well as the general foreign and security policy goals of Moscow; the Turkish-Russian relations, especially in the strategic environment of Caucasus and Central Asia; the continuation and intensification of the conventional arms race in the region and the horrifying prospect of mass destruction weapons' proliferation; the stability prospects of the Central Asian countries and the security of the oil routes; the future of the EU-Turkish relations and the prospects of membership; and finally the issue of Turkish national power itself, with reference to not only military dimension but mainly to the political, economic and social development of the country. The latter is of paramount importance and it has to do, mainly, with the management of internal uncertainties. The future conduct of Turkish foreign policy, and the future of Turkey as a security partner for the West will be determined to a great extent by internal developments. In this context the issue of the country's EU accession prospects acquires vital importance and the whole process becomes crucial for Turkey's future development course. See Kostas Ifantis, "Greece's Turkish Dilemmas: There and Back Again...", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, (vol. 5, no. 3, September 2005), pp. 383-384, Ian O. Lesser, "Western Interests in a Changing Turkey", στο Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser and F. Stephen Larrabee, *The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 59, Zalmay Khalilzad, "A Strategic Plan for Western-Turkish Relations", in Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser and F. Stephen Larrabee, *The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan*, pp. 82-96.

<sup>15</sup> "From the point of view of the EU's role in foreign affairs, Turkey's accession brings both advantages and challenges. It could help to stabilise the conflict-prone zone of the Middle East, but it would bring the EU into more direct involvement with the difficult political and security problems of the region. Turkey being a member would give the EU greater weight in regional and world affairs, but it could also make decision-making, especially under unanimity, more complicated. Summing up, Turkey could be a factor for enhancing stability and the role of the EU in the region, but its membership would present challenges as well as opportunities in the field of foreign affairs". Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Staff Working Document: Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective*, COM(2004) 656 final, p. 12.

<sup>16</sup> Dimitris N. Chrysohoou, *Για μια Ευρωπαϊκή Res Publica [For a European Res Publica]*, (Athens: Papazisis, 2005), p. 65.

<sup>17</sup> Filippos Savvidis, «Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ως «Καταλύτης» Επίλυσης του Κυπριακού» [The European Union as a "Catalyst" for Resolving the Cyprus Issue], in Panayotis Tsakonas (ed.), *Σύγχρονη Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική: Μια Συνολική Προσέγγιση [Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy: An Overall Approach]*, volume B, (Athens: I. Sideris, 2003), pp. 248-249. See also H. Tarik Oguzlu, "The Latest Turkish-Greek Détente: Instrumentalist Play for EU Membership, or Long-Term Institutional Cooperation?", p. 350.

Although in a variety of statements as also of pieces of legislative work in selected policy areas (specifically after the rise to power of the moderate Islamist Prime Minister Rejep Tayyip Erdogan) existed engagement and commitment by the Turkish side for the implementation of reform policies and for the promotion of wider socio-political changes aiming at the progressive country's convergence with the European model and the observance of its engagements towards the Union, it was the same time confirmed the durable manifestation of no agreement, incoherencies and contradictions between the "European language" that each Turkish leadership and the diplomatic core use on the one hand, and the systematic practice of government agencies on the other hand.

Moreover, it should not escape detection that the strenuous and long-term process of Europeanization that Turkey is asked to follow, does not merely imply a rhetorical ideological commitment to the objectives and the lofty ideals of the integration process (although the ideological acceptance of the objectives of European integration undoubtedly constitutes a vital precondition for the Europeanization process<sup>18</sup>). It incorporates a fundamental shift in mentality, ability to compromise, cooperation and synthesis that EU accession entails, along with the willingness and capacity of governments to define and execute national policies by placing them in the wider context of EU objectives. In other words, Europeanization dictates that the imperatives, norms, logic and practices of the EU become intrinsically absorbed into domestic policy, to the extent that the distinction between European and domestic policy requirements progressively ceases to exist<sup>19</sup>.

Furthermore, the results of the Europeanization process are in general asymmetric and experienced differently by member states and candidates, depending on factors such as the specific state formation, the administrative tradition and the patterns of policy-making, the political culture, the nature and structure of domestic market, the country's competitiveness, but also the balance of power between state and society on the one hand and national and sub national units on the other. It also depends on the expectations, significance and functional role a given member state accords to the European integration process and the EU in particular. In other words an important research question remains regarding "the extent to which a degree of European convergence in policy goals and policy contents is also leading to convergence in policy instruments and policy styles or policy patterns. While the direction and content of influence cannot be disputed, national-level arrangements and coalitions mediate and possibly limit the impact of Europeanization"<sup>20</sup>.

In the case of Turkey the intensity of Europeanization historically collides with the idiomorphic authoritarian model of modernist nationalism and uniform identity that was inflicted by the Kemalist elites leading to the establishment of the narrow and monolithic Turkish nation-state. This model fully conflicts with the model of post-modern state which continues to evolve in Europe (from the early 1990s) as a result of the integration process. "A hallmark of this kind of modern state is recognition of multiple identities with a strong emphasis on the promotion of minority rights"<sup>21</sup>.

In other words, the ideology of Turkish nationalism and the role of the state which preserves Kemalist heritage regarding the context of national sovereignty, internal cohesion and overall stability

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<sup>18</sup> Panayotis C. Ioakimidis, "Contradictions in the Europeanization Process", in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds), *Europe in Change: Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 33.

<sup>19</sup> Panayotis C. Ioakimidis, "Contradictions in the Europeanization Process", in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis (eds), *Europe in Change: Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?*, p. 33, Panayotis Ioakimidis, «Η Συμμετοχή της Ελλάδας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση: Πορεία, Αντιφάσεις, Συνέπειες» [The Participation of Greece to the European Union: Course, Contradictions, Implications], in Panayotis Tsakonias (ed.), *Σύγχρονη Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική: Μια Συνολική Προσέγγιση [Contemporary Greek Foreign Policy: An Overall Approach]*, volume B', (Athens: I. Sideris, 2003), p. 552.

<sup>20</sup> See Panayotis C. Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment", *South European Society and Politics*, special issue on Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, special issue editors), (vol. 5, no. 2, Autumn 2000), p. 73, Varvara Lalioli, *Η Μονάδα Οργάνωσης της Διαχείρισης του Κοινωνικού Πλαισίου Στήριξης: Ένα Παράδειγμα Εξευρωπαϊσμού της Δημόσιας Διοίκησης [Management Organization Unit of Community Support Framework: An Example of Europeanization in Public Administration]*, (Athens-Komotini: A. N. Sakkoulas, 2002), p. 28, Kostas A. Lavdas, *The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crisis of Integration*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 47.

<sup>21</sup> Ziya Onis, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era", *Turkish Studies*, (vol. 4, no. 1, 2003), pp. 11-12.

resist to the dynamic transforming notion of national sovereignty in the member states of the EU, especially in an era when the Union continues to evolve and transfigure itself into a very unique, highly complex supranational morphom. Unfortunately a number of times “the image of the West in the Kemalist mentality continues to represent the Other<sup>22</sup>”, failing to approach the dynamics of European integration with the constant flow of mutual pulling and sharing of traditional national sovereignty (i.e. even short of full membership, candidacy implies a great institutionalized scrutiny, convergence and compromise), which can be metaphorically compared with the image of a pendulum “held in place by the institutional structures of the EU, swinging between the magnetic fields of national sovereignty and of common action, the one with its comforting autonomy and identity and the other offering the benefits of integration, but at a price<sup>23</sup>”.

As the “historical heritage” placed explicit restrictive limits in Turkey’s modernization movement, the only way for its European aspirations to be able to keep pace with the model of EU’s integration process is to accept the need of an essential and extensive revision, structural reform and redefinition of the main pillars of the old fashioned Kemalist ideology (secularism, nationalism, reform), as well as the normative models that this imposed (constitutional and political-party institutional framework). For instance, the appearance of serious ideological and political conflicts and segregations is already observed, in the frame of a power struggle that is taking place in Turkey’s domestic politics (on the occasion of the process that should be followed with regard to the approach towards the EU) between traditional (Conservative Kemalists<sup>24</sup>) and the more genuine European friendly elite [Kemalists Reformers, moderate Islamists who belong to the progressive wing of the governing party (AKP)<sup>25</sup>] -which in any case have not appeared up to date in the expected degree-, in order to redefine the boundaries between the state and society as well as the relationships within the state structures and within society<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>22</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, “Turkey’s EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures”, *Middle East Policy*, (vol. IX, no. 2, June 2002), p. 131. As the writer argues “this image of a conspiratorial West bent on the destruction of Turkish national integrity with the collaboration of ‘internal enemies’ continues to exert a strong influence on their foreign-policy mentality”.

<sup>23</sup> William Wallace, “Government Without Statehood: The Unstable Equilibrium” in Wallace Helen and Wallace William (eds), *Policy-Making in the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 441.

<sup>24</sup> Conservative Kemalists are euroscepticists who desire Turkey’s accession to the EU, through traditional and narrow balance of power terms and considerations. In other words they attach nationalist approaches to their country’s European perspective, by setting strict limitations and asking for “special-case treatment” when it comes to full adaptation and compliance in a variety of issues related to democratic norms and practices that govern the European model. They would like to obtain all the benefits deriving from the accession process, without necessarily delegating or pulling any national power or sovereign rights to the supranational institutions of the EU, especially in policy areas that they consider should solely belong to Turkey’s domestic affairs domain. As one report concluded “while Turkish officials continue to play lip to the idea of EU membership, there is so far little evidence that the state establishment has fully grasped the fundamental shift in mentality, the willingness to compromise and work with others, that EU membership would entail. See Paul Kubicek, “The Earthquake, the European Union and Political Reform in Turkey”, *Mediterranean Politics*, (vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 2002), p. 14.

<sup>25</sup> Reformers support the promotion of fundamental changes in the conduct of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy, with the EU acting as the “safety valve” for the emergence of a new environment surrounded by order and security, where accountable and democratically elected governments will enhance their social legitimacy along with their capacity to foster European driven governance. See Dimitris Keridis, “Foreign Strategies and Domestic Choices: Balancing Between Power Politics and Interdependence”, στο Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (eds), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), p. 330, 332. Reformers were also influenced by the challenges that their country had to face after the end of the Cold War and the evolution of a new international system. In this respect alternative approached emerged regarding the concept of national interest and the role of military power, Turkey’s identity and orientation and finally perceived threats See Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey and the Mediterranean”, in Stelios Stavridis, Theodore Couloumbis and Thanos Veremis (eds), *The Foreign Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s*, (London: MacMillan, 1999), pp. 259-262. For the over-institutionalized and over-developed role of the state machinery relating to national security policies see Suleyman Sozen and Ian Shaw, “Turkey and the European Union: Modernizing a Traditional State?”, *Social Policy and Administration*, (vol. 37, no. 2, April 2003), p. 110 Panos Kazakos, “Το Αβέβαιο Μέλλον της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και η Τουρκία: Ιστορική Ταυτότητα, Θεσμοί και Υπερπέεταση στην Ευρώπη [The European Union’s Doubtful Future and Turkey: Historic Identity, Institutions and Overstretching in Europe], p. 142.

<sup>26</sup> Panayotis C. Ioakimidis, “The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment”, p. 73. O: Conservative Kemalists are mainly located in the centre-right (national left mainly), in the military and high-ranking/top-levels of bureaucracy. Reformers on the other hand are mainly located in the centre-right, liberal/social democratic left, and the progressive wing of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). See also Panayotis Tsakonias, “Turkey’s Post-Helsinki Turbulence: Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue”, *Turkish Studies*, (vol. 2, no. 2, Autumn 2001), pp. 11-12.

In this frame, both the present as well as future Turkish leaderships, which will undertake the task of orienting and managing the course of EU-Turkish relations, will be supposed to avoid the predominance of short-term anachronistic political practices and unilateral actions of the past, which have led many times to political and institutional inertia and insufficiency, anything else but to serve the long-term strategic planning of Turkey and the exploitation of the modern agenda of mutual benefit, that regional bodies like the EU try to cultivate among their member states and non member states. As a result, the country was deprived of the possibility to determine its position in the European sub system of regional integration, abolishing at the same time the dynamics and the increased international legitimacy that would lend to it its integration in a socio-economic supranational organization with international reputation as the EU and, through which, its regional and international role in the wider geographic region of South-eastern Europe, Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus<sup>27</sup>, would be further reflected. At the same time, in the current period of interdependence, in which the means and instruments of maintaining national sovereignty have radically changed, the reinforcement of the Europeanization process, as is set by the EU, will ensure the territorial integrity of Turkey, setting an end to the historical tradition of the famous “Sevres syndrome” and of the conspirator approach that Turkey is surrounded by internal and external enemies that work out scenarios of its destabilisation, aiming at its deconstruction and progressive disintegration<sup>28</sup>.

## **B) The Anchoring Capacity of the EU: Opportunities and Limitations**

There is no doubt that the EU was responsible for squeezing the “trigger”<sup>29</sup> and acting as the initial catalyst for the beginning of the reform process in Turkey. The initial limited breadth of changes (1999-2002) is related to the nationalist characteristics of conservative eurosceptic Kemalist elites which adopted in an old-fashioned, selective and instrumental manner, norms, values and frameworks that govern the European integration model of the EU (responding to the “logic of consequentiality” – do X because you will get Y-, rather than the “logic of appropriateness –do X because it is the right thing to do<sup>30</sup>-), along with the relative structural deficiencies that characterize coalition governments in Turkey. Nevertheless examples of these reforms that are included even in the 2004 revised Turkish National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) are the product of the interventionist model of international influence and anchoring capacity exercised by the EU towards candidate countries.

On the other hand, the exercise of a powerful political and anchoring role on behalf of the EU constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for further consolidating democracy in Turkey. Taking into consideration that in the case of this country strong ethnic, cultural or moral links with the EU are absent, the success of the process prior to membership in a such an environment becomes problematic, mainly with regard to the assessment of cost-reward on behalf of the aspirant state and the side effects that this will involve in maintaining essential engagement on its part (i.e. the rewards of membership are less consistent and the costs perhaps larger, leading the candidate country to show less ideational commitment toward membership)<sup>31</sup>. In other words, it is considered necessary to cultivate a more durable mix of political and social interaction and feedback between the two sides (Turkey and EU), so that the problems and the difficulties that have been detected during the pre-accession process are sufficiently dealt with.

To this direction, by approaching the EU as a “window of opportunity” for consolidating democracy, strengthening the rule of law, modernizing the party system and finally contribute to the

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<sup>27</sup> Dimitris Keridis, “Foreign Strategies and Domestic Choices: Balancing Between Power Politics and Interdependence”, in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (eds), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, p. 330.

<sup>28</sup> Ayten Gundogdu, “Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, (vol. 5, no. 1, March 2001), p. 110, Hasan Kösebalaban, “Turkey’s EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures”, *Middle East Policy*, (vol. IX, no. 2, June 2002), p. 131.

<sup>29</sup> Paul Kubicek, “The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, (vol. 6, no. 3, September 2005), p. 373.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid* p. 362.

<sup>31</sup> H. Tarik Oguzlu, “The Latest Turkish-Greek Détente: Instrumentalist Play for EU Membership, or Long-Term Institutional Cooperation?”, p. 339, Paul Kubicek, “The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in Turkey”, p. 367.

establishment of an open and pluralist polity, the political elites will have to pursue the initiation of radical policies aiming at the essential liberalism and eventual democratisation of the Turkish state. The implementation of such an ambitious project of cooperative coexistence will strengthen the process of progressive integration between the state and the society and will pave the way for cultivating a more genuine Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which, reversing the frame of long-lasting tradition that determined the process of interaction between the secular “centre” and increasing Islamic-friendly “periphery”<sup>32</sup>, will promote the harmonious and peaceful coexistence between secular and religious society and mutual respect between one other<sup>33</sup>. Nowadays, the achievement of this synthesis is considered necessary more than ever before, in order that the Turkish society, by learning to combine the modern with the traditional, realises its nature and its dynamics, so that it finally determines its national identity and orientation.

In this respect, the transformation of moderate Islamists’ political identity, as this is reflected progressively from 1997 onwards, and the active support that they have been offering to Turkey’s European prospects and the required reforms, will increase the possibilities that this process is accomplished with success. In any case, their work will be assessed by the reliability of their policies towards the EU (e.g. although drafting the proper legislation constitutes a prerequisite for the initiation of any reform package, the EU pays particular attention to monitoring the proper application and full implementation of the adopted laws), as in the past there were more than few cases, where the EC/EU “card” was used by parties and politicians with inconsistency and on purpose for serving domestic political needs, personal ambitions and short-term political interests.

Finally, regarding the future course of civil-military relations, even though the military continues to sustain its dominant normative power<sup>34</sup>, as long as “Turkish mainstream politicians continue to progressively nurture the strengthening of a political culture based on national integration that is compatible with responsible participation of Muslim or minority groups in the political sphere, the military’s role will slowly lose its basis for legitimacy<sup>35</sup>”.

Unfortunately, such kind of developments will be neither easy nor short-term, since many of the above mentioned deficiencies are strongly related to deep historical and institutional traditions which reflect the state’s own values and the context of Turkish political culture<sup>36</sup>. Actually the pace of transforming and carefully redefining a country’s political culture<sup>37</sup> -even through the positive effects of the Europeanization process- will lead only in the long-run to convergence, adaptation and respect for norms, values, interests, new policy practices, styles and patterns. However, only through this cultural transition, a gradual turnaround will take place, by shifting priorities from politics of identity

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<sup>32</sup> Ali Carkoglu, “Conclusion”, *Turkish Studies*, (vol. 6, no. 2, June 2005), p. 318.

<sup>33</sup> Turkey is a country that presents “multiple faces” at the economic, social and cultural level, as a result of its geography and demographics with a variety of intense incongruities, contradictions and inequalities.

<sup>34</sup> Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Τουρκικός Εξσηγχρονισμός - Ισλάμ και Τουρκοζωήπιοι στη Δαιδαλώδη Διαδρομή του Κεμαλισμού [Turkish Modernization – Islam and Turkish Cypriots in the Rambling Course of Kemalism*, (Athens: Vivliorama, 2004), p. 93.

<sup>35</sup> Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Europe’s Tainted Mirror: Reflections on Turkey’s Candidacy Status After Helsinki?”, in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (eds), *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, (Herndon: Brassey’s, 2001), pp. 270-271. This consists of a foreseen development after the rise to power of AKP, since up to 2002 the reproduction of Cizre’s model for civil-military relations has been observed. According to this model “a political class threatened by the formal and informal role of the military as the ultimate guardian of the regime has critical problems in relinquishing patronage resources. In that guardianship model, the political class constantly weighs the political pay-off derived from a reform in the system – to put an end to powerlessness, incapacity, corruption and stasis – against the costs of giving up power based on patronage. It is more than likely that the civilian political class will not choose to terminate rent-seeking networks by reforms that would reduce the prominence of the military in politics. Its foremost concern will be a short rather than a long-term one”. Soli Özel, “Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 14, no 2, April 2003, p. 88. See also Ali Carkoglu, “Conclusion”, pp. 314-315, Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Τουρκικός Εξσηγχρονισμός - Ισλάμ και Τουρκοζωήπιοι στη Δαιδαλώδη Διαδρομή του Κεμαλισμού [Turkish Modernization - Islam and Turkish Cypriots in the Rambling Course of Kemalism* p. 93, 101, Metin Heper, “The Justice and Development Party; Government and the Military in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, (vol.6, no.2, June 2005), pp. 227-228, Metin Heper, “The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy”, *South European Society and Politics*, (vol. 10, no. 1, April 2005), pp. 33-44.

<sup>36</sup> Sefa Simsek, “The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity to Quality”, *Turkish Studies*, (vol. 5, no. 3, Autumn 2004), p. 70.

<sup>37</sup> Paul Kubicek, “The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in Turkey”, p. 363, Kostas A. Lavdas, *The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crisis of Integration*, p. 47.

to genuine models of active interaction and participation, in order to set off totalitarian trends which have been embedded in the mentality of civil society.

The magnitude, duration and the qualitative features related to the kind of pressure exercised by the EU, for the proper implementation of all necessary political, institutional, administrative and economic reforms, coupled by the gradual education and training of citizens awareness in democratic norms and practices -who will offer legitimacy and support in a more proactive and participatory manner<sup>38</sup> for the system's political liberalization- will cause a "boomerang effect" "in which elites resistant to change (conservative Kemalist elites) are caught "in a pincer" as pressure comes about both from outside and from domestic actors"<sup>39</sup>.

In light of the above, it is true that in the course of history Kemalist modernizing elites have lost their monopoly over discussions and debates touching upon the country's political and cultural orientation. In contemporary Turkey, with the diffusion and spread of knowledge, education and wealth, a large and still growing strong middle-class has evolved, which doesn't approach as incompatible, a model which allows the coexistence of a strong religious identity with the modern way of life. Taking into consideration this prospect, "both Europeans and Islamic nations would benefit from the example of the nation accepting its dual national identities in peaceful co-existence"<sup>40</sup>.

The recognition on behalf of the European Parliament –the responsible institution to represent the peoples of Europe- "that the political values of the European Union are chiefly based on the Judaeo-Christian and humanist culture of Europe, but that no-one has a monopoly on these universal values of democracy, the rule of law, human and minority rights and freedoms of religion and conscience - values which can perfectly well be accepted and defended by a country where the majority of the population is Muslim; believes, therefore, that there are no objections of principle to its EU membership"<sup>41</sup>, should be mostly exploited for the strengthening of the Union's social legitimacy and social influence in the eyes of Turkish citizens, so as to cooperate for the political liberalization and democratization of Turkish polity<sup>42</sup>. In this respect, the positive effects of the process of social, political and policy Europeanization will occur as a result of an "endogenous process of change within the Turkish institutional, political, economic and social context which will interlock with the external dynamics embedded in the accession process"<sup>43</sup>.

On the contrary, the reproduction of the traditional model with inflicted authoritarian changes (imposed either from "above" or from "outside"), will offer too little to cultivate and consolidate independent social agents and a broader genuine democratic ethos, by experiencing a problematic process of democratic transition and endangering the creation of an artificial and vulnerable democracy<sup>44</sup>, where procedural and instrumental requirements for democracy will be implemented, and yet political and societal pre-conditions for democratic consolidation will be missing (as a result of sustaining the old systemic values and the main pillars of Kemalist's ideology which cannot change by institutional engineering only<sup>45</sup>). Such a development will most probably lead to stagnation and

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<sup>38</sup> "Civil society fatigue" should also be taken into consideration. It is true that there is time inconsistency during the accession process, "since expected reforms are demanded in the short and medium term, but the actual delivery of the benefits (that is membership) occurs in the long run. In this case, the unpredictability of the long term reduces the value of the benefit and in turn the incentives for reform. So the uncertainty of the process, due both to its timing and to the developments that will unfold in the meantime, inevitably affects Turkey's incentives to engage in difficult reforms in the short term". Nathalie Tocci, "Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor to Reform?", *South European Society and Politics*, File: Turkey, Europeanization, and Civil Society (vol. 10, no. 1, April 2005), p. 78.

<sup>39</sup> Paul Kubicek, "The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in Turkey", p. 363, 373.

<sup>40</sup> Hasan Kösebalaban, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures", p. 145.

<sup>41</sup> Resolution of the European Parliament, P5\_TA-PROV (2003) 0265, par. 3.

<sup>42</sup> See also Thomas Diez, Apostolos Agnantopoulos and Alper Kaliber, "Introduction", *South European Society and Politics*, File: Turkey, Europeanization, and Civil Society (vol. 10, no. 1, April 2005), p. 3-6, Paul Kubicek, "The European Union and Grassroots Democratization in Turkey", p. 362, 364.

<sup>43</sup> Nathalie Tocci, "Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor to Reform?", p. 82.

<sup>44</sup> Sefa Simsek, "The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity to Quality", p. 70.

<sup>45</sup> Panayotis J. Tsakonas and Dimitri C. Conostas, "Turkey's Democratic Process and International Stability after Helsinki: A Research Agenda", *Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies*, (vol. 8, no. 2, 2000), p. 179, Leda-Agapi Glyptis, "The Cost of Rapprochement: Turkey's Erratic EU Dream as a Clash of Systemic Values", *Turkish Studies*, (vol. 6, no. 3, September 2005), p. 417.

progressive deterioration of EU-Turkish relations by exploring alternative models of cooperation for the two parties (special/privileged partnership), following the ultimate failure of the aim for full-membership<sup>46</sup>.

Concluding, in an era of interdependence, pluralism and multiculturalism, it will be wise to try and approach more cautiously not only the “center” of Europe but also its “periphery”. As Duff states, “a Union that is frightened to reinforce its liberal and parliamentary character will be an unattractive Union for acceding member states and an unreliable partner upon the world stage. Where Europe stops should not be a matter of geography but of liberal values and democratic practices, clearly defined and brightly illuminated so that the candidate countries know where the European journey will bring them<sup>47</sup>”. The EU, being a community that professes specific values and has the intention of overcoming the clusters and the complexities of the past along with the dividing lines which in the course of ages marked European history, it should lean over more carefully regarding the case of Turkey and its European perspective, in order to develop a better understanding of the country’s historical and political tradition and a thorough analysis regarding what Turks think of themselves and where do they actually place both themselves and their country. Moreover the events in the Balkans during the 1990s combined with flows of refugees and immigrants –from distant past up to present times-, come to remind to the political elites and the peoples living in the member states of the EU, that contemporary Europe cannot be defined and entrenched within narrow and traditionally oriented geographic frameworks.

Either way, Turkey will need a more detailed roadmap, as a result of its size and the duration of accession negotiations that might last up to 15 years or even more. During this period, transitional provisions, derogations, special arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses might be considered for ensuring alignment along with protecting the interests of both the EU and Turkey (such statements have already been included in the Negotiating Framework between the EU and Turkey). Furthermore, the governments of member states and the Union’s institutions should design an improved strategy of constructive anchoring in order to ensure Turkey’s commitment to Europe and provide assistance as a strategic partner towards the country’s genuine pro-European elites, which slowly but steadily adjust their presence in Turkey’s post-Helsinki social and political front.

## Conclusion

In this asymmetric and problematic relation –since the EU is not in a position to feel any sense of urgency to fulfill its self-declared goals and strategies- it can be argued that after the new Helsinki process in 1999, Turkey will have to anchor itself more than the EU to anchor Turkey, to the goal of an eventual membership. It will be supposed consequently, that the political, economic and social elites, make proper use of the whole means and instruments offered by the EU during the last years to support Turkey’s pre-accession strategy, in order to achieve the progressive engagement and the anchoring of their country in the European vehicle (with the aim of full-membership), by shaping a democratic state free of Kemalist standards and the burdens of its historical past.

The road will be long and - as the challenges and the choices that will be put in front, belong to Turkey - an essential dialogue should immediately begin in the country, related to the whole range of costs and benefits deriving from a future accession (whereby it will be supposed that, subjects related so much as with historical, political and institutional tradition, which accompany and determine the role of the Turkish state, the protection of national sovereignty and national interests towards the supranational models of enhanced cooperation that apply in the EU in a wide area of policies, are

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<sup>46</sup> See Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, December 16-17 2004, 16238/1/04 REV 1, p. 7: “The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the Candidate State is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that the Candidate State concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond”.

<sup>47</sup> Andrew Duff, member of the European Parliament (ELDR), 12/01/1999, European Parliament Debate on preparation of European Council of 10-11 December 1999.

regularly discussed). In order that this is achieved, it shall be ensured that, at least two successive Turkish governments will follow with vision, consequence, competence and determination, a coherent and cohesive strategy, constant and non-reversible, so that they fulfill all of EU's criteria and preconditions along with the future evolution of the *acquis*.

This strategy will be politically viable only if the Turkish society knows that the accession process will be long-lasting and difficult, while simultaneously it will be witness of tangible and concrete improvements from successive governments. If the above process - the result of which is not possible to be before hand determined - is brought to end with success, Turkey's accession to the EU will not be perceived as a threat for the security, stability and the prosperity of the member states and their citizens, hence, also for the self-determination of the EU, but as an important historical occasion, as it will be about another, a very different Turkey from the one known today, modern, democratic, stable and consequently compatible with the European community of shared values and interests. Finally, the achievement of this ambitious objective with the radical metamorphosis of the Turkish Democracy will certify in a unique manner, because of the size of the country and the particularities that it presents, the size and the extension of the intervention model, international influence, attractive force and anchoring capacity that the EU exercises.

In light of the above, accession of Turkey to the Union would be truly challenging for both the EU and Turkey. If it takes place, it will be very different from all previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey's population, size, cultural and religious characteristics, geographical and geopolitical location, economic security and military potential. Accession negotiations which started in October 2005 will last at least ten 10-15 years. During this period the EU will further evolve and develop itself (both at the economic and political level), and Turkey should change even more radically. As a result, the dynamic course of *acquis*' further evolution (where Turkey's adaptation cannot be merely legal and typical, but deeply social and collective in order to secure its untrammelled implementation), to effectively respond to the needs of EU-27 or more, in relation to the redefinition and the capability for synthesis of diverging national interests, strategies and policies on behalf of the member states of the EU towards Turkey, will continue to influence the spectrum of challenges and opportunities of its possible accession.

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# Children's Educational and Occupational Aspirations in Urban Nigeria: Implications for Policy Development

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## **Abstract**

This paper uses data from interviews with 1535 children and their parents in urban Nigeria to examine children's educational and occupational aspirations, and parents' aspirations for their children. The findings indicate that an overwhelming majority of children plan to attain post secondary college/university qualifications and engage in professional occupations such as doctors, teachers, lawyers etc. Parents' aspirations for children are similar to children's goals. There is no difference between male and female children regarding educational desires or career aspirations. Also, there is no significant variation in parents' aspirations for males and female children. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that several factors including parental socio-economic variables such as education, occupation, and income strongly determine children's educational and occupational aspirations. These findings have implications for policies aimed at strengthening human capital formation and development in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Children's educational aspirations, children's occupational aspirations; parental aspirations; gender difference, parental socio-economic status

**JEL Classification Codes:** J1, J10, J13, I 20

## **Introduction**

Children's educational aspirations have often been considered valuable predictors of their educational attainment (Rumberger, 1983; 1995; Buriel and Cardoza, 1988; Hanson, 1994; Kao and Tienda, 1995; Hernandez, 1998; Buchmann and Dalton, 2002). Ultimately, their accomplishments will serve as a vehicle for personal advancement through future employment opportunities. In light of this, this paper uses data collected through interviews with parents and their children in urban Nigeria to examine children's educational and occupational goals. We will assert that an understanding of children's educational and occupational aspirations, as well parents' educational and occupational aspirations for their children could serve as useful barometers for predicting a country's human social capital growth and development. Such an investigation could also influence policy makers to pursue appropriate strategies for bolstering resources which could enhance later opportunities for children. Furthermore, while the burgeoning increase in Nigeria's population growth have led to a widespread expansion of all levels of educational institutions, we will argue that a study of educational and career aspirations of children currently enrolled in elementary and secondary schools, in particular, would enable policy makers to determine the extent to which children's need for higher education could be met. In addition, policy makers would have a sense of which sectors of the economy that should be expanded in order to accommodate the employment needs of society.

An exploration of the educational and occupational aspirations of children allows for a look at the socio-cultural dynamics that are related to human capital development. For instance, while previous studies have demonstrated the existence of gender bias in children's educational and occupational opportunities in Africa (Davison and Kanyuka, 1984; Chernichovsky, 1985), our view is that since

independence, many African countries, including Nigeria, have been undergoing rapid social change, especially in urban areas. The effect of urbanization and the accompanying social change tend to impact social attitudes and gender structuring, which incidentally shape how men and women are defined as well as their roles in society. As such, a study of the educational and employment aspirations of children could be useful in determining the extent to which the Nigerian family is responding to forces of modernization. Do boys and girls have different educational and occupational aspirations? And how can the differences, if any, be explained in terms of the changing nature of the Nigerian society? We seek in this paper to detect whether the traditional gender variation in children's education and occupation still persists in the context of a modernizing society, such as Nigeria. We also inquire whether parents' aspirations for their children vary by gender.

Additionally, previous studies have found the link between parental education and children's educational and occupational achievements (Wolfe and Behrman, 1984; Chernichovsky and Meesook, 1985; Smith and Cheung, 1986; King and Lillard, 1987; Jamison and Lockheed, 1987; Lockheed, Fuller, and Nyrongo, 1989; Dale, Shaheem, Kalra, and Fieldhouse, 2002). Furthermore, parental employment as well as family size and composition, both of which are directly related to the household's income level, are regarded as major determinants of children's educational success (Powell and Steelman, 1989; 1990; Knodel, 1992; Shavit and Blossfield, 1993; Pong, 1997; Dale, Shaheem, Kalra, and Fieldhouse, 2002). However, we have uncovered no study in Nigeria that examines the social capital ambitions of children, let alone investigates how factors such as parental socio-economic status (education, employment, and income), religion, and family structure variables could influence children's educational and career aspirations. We fill this gap in the literature by utilizing the 2002 survey of 1535 children (aged 8 to 14 years) and their parents to examine factors that are associated with children's educational and career aspirations. We also aim to analyze how the children's educational and career ambitions compare to parents' aspirations for their children.

Educational and occupational aspirations provide a glimpse as to the caliber of future adults, which of course could determine the pace and level of a country's socio-economic development. At the micro level, the overall quality of life could be contingent upon the level of education and type of employment an individual holds. Therefore, we will affirm that children's social status aspirations could shape future decisions regarding health and hygiene, nutrition, housing needs, and knowledge of family planning programs, especially, in a rapidly growing population such as Nigeria where economic and social progress depend on the survival on the fittest.

This paper proceeds with the synthesis of the literature. We then discuss the sources of data and methods of analysis. This section is followed by the presentation of the findings. Finally, the conclusions and policy recommendations are articulated.

## **Literature Review**

There is a distinction between children's educational and occupational aspirations and children's educational and occupational attainment. Nonetheless, very few studies focus on children's aspirations. As a result, we will argue that useful insights from the plethora of research that addresses children's educational and occupational attainment would be relevant for our analysis. Our reason for relying on the literature regarding educational attainment rests solely on the widely held assumption that educational aspirations could serve as reliable predictors of educational achievement (Rumberger, 1983; 1995; Buriel and Cardoza, 1988; Hanson, 1994; Kao and Tienda, 1995; Hernandez, 1998; Buchmann and Dalton, 2002).

We begin with the literature that addresses children's educational and occupational aspirations. In a study of Pakistani families living in the United Kingdom, Dale et al. (2002) found that children's high educational aspirations were positively related to the parent's educational and occupational levels. In other words, children were more likely to aspire for educational and occupational statuses similar to their parents. A related study conducted by Behnke, Piercy, and Diversi (2004), which focused on

Latinos in the United States, observed that educated parents acted as examples for their children and their children reported high aspirations for their future. In another study conducted in Thailand, Lockheed, Fuller, and Nyirongo (1989) noted that children's educational motivation is directly related to parents' determination to succeed in the modern sector economy. In all three studies, parents' strong influence on children's plans for their future education and occupation was evident. These findings lend credence to the socialization theory, which emphasizes the role of the family in children's learning. The findings also indicate that parents with high levels of education serve as positive role models for their children. The children then recognize, through the parental support and critical observations they make, that higher education is expected of them and is a necessary element of a successful life.

Studies have also documented that a positive relationship exists between children's educational and occupational achievement and parental socio-economic status. Evidence of such studies is found in the developing countries of Asia (Smith and Cheung, 1986; Jamison and Lockheed, 1987; King and Lillard, 1987) and Africa (Mbilinyi, 1969; Egbose, 1981). Besides the effects of parental education and occupation on children's achievement, other factors such as gender, family size, and rural-urban difference, have been mentioned. With respect to gender, on the one hand, a myriad of scholars in countries of Malawi (Davison and Kanyuka, 1984), Pakistan (Dale et al., 2002), Malaysia (Shreeniwas, 1993), and Guyana (Wilson, Wilson, and Berkely-Caines, 2003) detected that boys most often tend to achieve higher educational success than girls. Explanations for this finding are derived from the gender socialization theory. The gender structuring and cultural definitions of roles create the perceptions that boys will ultimately serve as the breadwinner of the family, which limit the educational and occupational opportunities allowed for girls. On the other hand, research based in Nicaragua (Wolfe and Behrman, 1984), Botswana (Chernichovsky, 1985), and Thailand (Lockheed, Fuller, and Nyirongo, 1989) show that girls are not only more often enrolled in school, but tend to remain in the system longer. The general finding from these studies is that because of parents' desire to have boys contribute to the agricultural work of the household at an early age; girls' education receives a higher priority which consequently enables girls to receive higher education.

Family size has been found to have a significant negative impact on educational achievement especially in developed countries (Polit, 1982; Blake, 1989; Powell and Steelman, 1989; Downey, 1995). The resource-dilution model (Blake, 1981; 1989) has most often been used to explain this relationship between family size and children's educational attainment. The model posits that the larger the family size, the fewer the resources available for children's education. However, the theory has limited application in less developed countries because children do not only dilute, but also contribute, to the sustenance of the family. Furthermore, the roles of the extended family and universal free education in many countries in Africa tend to mitigate the effect of large family size on children's educational achievement (Hermalin et al., 1982; Knodel, Chamrathirong, and Nebavayla, 1987; Shavit and Pierce, 1991; Lloyd, 1994).

Finally, educational achievement has been found to differ by region of the country where children live. For instance, in Botswana, Chernichovsky (1985) observed that children raised in an urban environment had higher levels of education than their rural counterparts. Wolfe and Behrman's (1984) research in Nicaragua produced similar results. Both studies lend support to modernization theory (Schramm, 1964; Giddens, 1991a; 1991b; Bauman, 2000). According to this theory, as a country develops and becomes aware of "modern" lifestyles prevailing in developed societies, it is expected that the traditional lifestyle is replaced by a more Western culture. Consequently, urban families, who have more access to mainstream Western influences, would consider education to be a priority in line with the view of most families in developed countries.

While this review demonstrates that many studies have explored the dynamics of children's occupation and education in both developed and less developed countries, the need for additional research still remains. Our observation is that the bulk of the literature has largely focused on children's educational achievement. While this is important and applauded, our contention is that

knowledge of children's educational goals is critical for predicting future socio-economic and cultural development of a developing nation, like Nigeria. Furthermore, a joint analysis of children's educational and occupational aspirations is rarely considered or discussed in the literature. As such, we will argue that knowledge of both sets of aspirations is germane to a broad prediction of the economic success of an individual. In addition to examining the influence of parental socio-economic status on children's aspirations, we will expand the knowledge on this topic by determining the extent to which certain household variables, such as household size, religion, type of household (monogamy/polygyny), family structure (nuclear/extended), and parental place of birth influence children's aspirations. Additionally, this study is unique because we have uncovered no single study that examines this topic in Nigeria, despite its size and its intellectual vibrancy. Finally, the cogency of this analysis is largely due to the availability of 1535 children (aged 8 to 14) who are already engaged in the labor force. Such data sets provide an uncommon opportunity to listen to children's voices regarding their aspirations and parents' views regarding the educational and occupational aspirations for their children.

### **Data Source and Methodology**

The data used in this paper are part of a 2002 survey which took place in Abeokuta, the capital of Ogun State in Southwestern Nigeria. The interviews were conducted by the principal investigator and a team of thirteen trained research assistants. Funding for this project was provided through generous grants from the Center for Ethnicity, Gender, and Global Studies, The Center for History and Culture, and Faculty Development Grants at the authors' institution. Methodologically, a two-staged stratified sampling technique was used to ensure that the sample represents the entire population. The stratification technique consisted of four zones that were identified based on the city's residential makeup: the elite zone (high income residents), the migrant zone (migrant workers with a medium to low income), the mixed zone (both migrant and non-migrant workers with medium to low income), and the traditional zone (made up of the city's native residents). Following the zoning identification process, households were systematically chosen on randomly selected major streets.

The primary goal of the survey was to explore the causes, patterns, and outcomes of child labor. Therefore, it was necessary for household to meet a series of prerequisites. First, a parent (or adult guardian) had to be present and willing to participate in the study. Additionally, a child between the ages of 8 and 14, who was involved in some type of economic activity, enrolled school, and had resided in that household for at least one year prior to the interview, must also be present. Upon consent of the parent, the child was then interviewed. At the end of the interview process, a total of 1535 children and their parents were successfully interviewed.

Relevant to this paper, besides issues related to child labor, the respondents were asked questions regarding educational and occupational aspirations. Both the children and the parents shared their perceptions. This information, combined with the broad socio-demographic and economic data gathered from the respondents allow us to examine children's aspirations and parents' educational and career goals for their children. From a unique perspective, and unlike most previous studies, the data also allows us to consider socio-economic and family structure variables that might greatly influence both the children and parents' future plans. Our hope is that this additional information may result in a more comprehensive understanding of educational and occupational aspirations beyond those found in western societies.

The analysis in this paper proceeds as follows. We begin with the presentation of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of children and their parents, shown in Table 1. This is followed by Table 2 with a descriptive analysis of the children's educational and occupational aspirations as well as the parents' goals for their children. We then show, in Table 3, if any differences exist between males and females concerning children's desired levels of education and career goals. In addition, we examine whether parents' goals for their children vary by gender of the child. Finally, we

use a bivariate analysis to examine the influence of a host of factors including parental socio-economic status and family structure variables, on children's educational and occupational aspirations, as shown in Tables 4 and 5. The significance of the results is tested using chi-square tests of association.

## Results

The characteristics of the respondents provided in Table 1 show that the gender distribution of the interviewed children is nearly equal, although girls make up a slight majority. The average age of the children at the time of the survey was 12 years old. On the average, the respondent's household size was 6 persons. Not surprisingly, in a high fertility society such as Nigeria, the average number of children living within the household is four. And because of the urban nature of the sample, most respondents live in both nuclear and monogamous households.

A large majority of parents (81 per cent) reported earnings of about twenty-thousand Naira per month. This is not unexpected considering the deteriorating economic situation in Nigeria. The number of parents earning income above #41, 000 Naira offer justification for using child labor as a strategy for providing additional income to the household. With regard to parental education, while 4 out of 10 had obtained elementary education, only a quarter (26.4 per cent) had acquired a post-secondary college/university education. The relatively high percentage of respondents with college/university education is a reflection of the social sophistication, awareness, and government's free educational policies which began in the Western part of Nigeria in the 1960s. The parents come from a variety of occupational situations, with nearly equal percentages working in the trade/business sector, the service industry, and as teachers or other types of professionals. Also, with regards to parental background factors which may influence children's educational and occupational wishes, the findings show that the majority of the respondents were born in an urban setting (61.8 per cent), compared to slightly over one-third that were born in the rural areas (38.2 per cent). Most of the respondents identify with the Christian faith (58.4 per cent), although many follow Islamic (39 per cent) or Traditional religious beliefs (2.5 per cent).

In Table 2, we present data that describes children's educational and occupational goals as well as parent's aspirations for their children. The findings reveal that an overwhelming majority of parents (86.6 per cent) intend for their children to acquire the highest educational status in the form of post-secondary college/polytechnic or university education. Not surprisingly, children also plan to acquire the highest educational qualification, similar to their parents' wish for them. In the same way, parents express high expectations for their children's occupational career. While about 72 per cent wish that their children become involved in professional occupations such as lawyers, doctors, teachers etc, less than 5 per cent hope that their children engage in petty trading/business activities later in life. Likewise, this study finds that the majority of the children, about 80 per cent, aspire to work in highly rated professional fields.

**Table 1:** Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

<b>Child's Age by Years**</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>(%)</b>
8	40	2.6
9	68	4.4
10	166	10.8
11	119	7.8
12	283	18.4
13	337	22.0
14	522	34.0
** Average age of child = 12.3 years		
<b>Sex of Child</b>		
Male	674	43.9
Female	861	56.1
<b>Size of the Child's Household**</b>		
0 - 4	272	17.7
5 - 9	1187	77.3
10+	76	5.0
** Average household size = 6.09 persons		
<b>Total Number of Children in the Household**</b>		
1	42	2.7
2	167	10.9
3	360	23.5
4	458	29.8
5	282	18.4
6	152	9.9
7	48	3.1
8	14	0.9
9	6	0.4
12	6	0.4
** Average number of children = 4.0 children		
<b>Child's Type of Household</b>		
Monogamy	1035	67.4
Polygyny	500	32.6
<b>Child's Parent Family Structure</b>		
Nuclear	1124	73.2
Extended	411	26.8
<b>Head of Household's Income per Month^</b>		
Below #20,000	1243	81.0
#21,000 - 40,000	178	11.6
#41,000+	114	7.4
<b>Parental Education</b>		
Primary/Elementary	617	40.2
Secondary/High School	266	17.3
College/Polytechnic/University	405	26.4
Drop out/No education	247	16.1
<b>Parental Occupation</b>		
Trading/Business	592	38.6
Services (hairdressers, tailors)	436	28.4
Admin/Management/Professional/Teachers		
<b>Parental Religion</b>		
Islam	599	39.0
Christianity	897	38.2
Traditional Religion	39	2.5
<b>Parental Birth Place</b>		
Urban	949	61.8
Rural	586	38.2

**Table 2:** Educational and Occupational Aspirations

<b>Parent's Educational Aspiration for children</b>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
Primary/Elementary	70	4.6
Secondary/High School	135	8.8
College/Polytechnic/University	1330	86.6
<b>Parent's Occupational Wish for Children</b>		
trading/business	69	4.5
blue collar (carpenters, mechanics etc.)	363	23.6
professionals (teachers, engineers, doctors, lawyers etc.)	1103	71.9
<b>Children's Highest Educational Aspiration</b>		
Primary/Elementary	135	8.8
Secondary/High School	101	6.6
College/Polytechnic/University	1299	84.6
<b>Children's Highest Occupational Aspiration</b>		
trading/business	90	5.9
blue collar (carpenters, mechanics etc.)	26	14.7
professionals (teachers, engineers, doctors, lawyers etc.)	1219	79.4

Overall, it is clear from Table 2 that children's educational and occupational aspirations seem to be similar to those envisioned for them by their parents. This finding lends credence to the socialization theory and attests to the powerful effect of parents' values on children. In other words, this result corroborates other studies which show that parental plans for educational success tend to be similar to children's educational goals (Lockheed, Fuller, and Nyirongo, 1989; Dale et al., 2002; Behnke, Piercy, and Diversi, 2004).

Table 3 presents information that enables us to assess whether there are gender differences between children's educational and occupational aspirations. The findings indicate that while a slightly higher percentage of females than males aspire for the highest educational qualification (87.3 per cent of females versus 81.2 per cent of males) there are no gender differences in children's highest occupational goals. Furthermore, the findings show that while more than four-fifths of the parents desire that their children attain a post-secondary college/university education, there seems to be no significant difference in their aspirations for boys and girls. Similarly, parents' occupational aspirations for their children do not vary for male and female children.

**Table 3:** Educational and Occupational Aspirations according to Children's Gender Distribution

	<i>Sex of</i>	<i>Child</i>
<b>Parent's highest educational aspirations for their children</b>	<i>male</i>	<i>female</i>
Primary/Elementary	4.9	4.3
Secondary/High School	9.6	8.1
College/Polytechnic/University	85.5	87.6
<b>Children's highest educational aspirations**</b>		
Primary/Elementary	12.0	6.3
Secondary/High School	6.8	6.4
College/Polytechnic/University	81.2	87.3
<b>Parent's occupational aspirations for their children</b>		
trading/business	4.2	4.8
blue collar (carpenters, mechanics etc.)	24.5	23.0
professionals (teachers, engineers, doctors, lawyers etc.)	71.4	72.2
<b>Children's occupational wish</b>		
trading/business	5.6	6.0
blue collar (carpenters, mechanics etc.)	16.0	13.7
professionals (teachers, engineers, doctors, lawyers etc.)	78.3	80.3
** p < 0.01		
* p < 0.05		

Table 4 shows the analysis of children's educational aspirations according to children's characteristics, parents' socio-economic status, and household structure. Respondents with parents native to the urban area, as well as those that are Christians, have significantly higher educational aspirations, such as college/polytechnic or university degrees. Similarly, those who come from monogamous or nuclear households appear to have aspired for the highest educational qualifications. Furthermore, parental education, occupation, and income are all significantly and positively related to their children's educational aspirations. Therefore, the higher the parents' socio-economic status, the higher the proportion of children that express high educational goals. The smaller the household size, the higher the proportion of children that aspire for college/polytechnic or university education. Finally, we find that children who work for themselves rather than for their parents, as well as those who are allowed to keep the wages they earn, have higher educational status aspirations than those who work for the benefit of their household.

**Table 4:** Children's Educational Aspirations as Determined by Children's Characteristics, Parental Socio-economic Status, and Family Structure Variables

	<b>Educational Aspirations</b>		
	<b>Elementary</b>	<b>Secondary</b>	<b>College/University</b>
<b>Parental Place of Birth**</b>			
Rural	8.8	15.0	78.2
Urban	3.2	5.0	91.9
<b>Parental Religion**</b>			
Islam	8.7	10.7	80.6
Traditional Religion	23.1	2.6	74.4
Christianity	7.8	3.7	88.5
<b>Parental Type of Marriage**</b>			
Monogamy	4.0	6.7	89.4
Polygyny	5.8	13.2	81.0
<b>Parental Family Structure*</b>			
Nuclear	4.0	7.7	88.3
Extended	4.1	11.9	82.0
<b>Household Size**</b>			
0-4	3.7	7.4	89.0
5-9	4.1	8.3	87.6
10+	14.5	22.4	63.2
<b>Parental Education**</b>			
No Education	10.0	18.7	71.3
Elementary/Primary	4.1	10.7	85.2
Secondary	2.4	3.1	94.4
Post Secondary/College/University	0.7	2.3	97.0
<b>Parental Occupation**</b>			
Trading/Business	7.1	9.1	83.8
Blue Collar/Services	9.1	12.3	82.9
Professionals (Doctors, Teachers, etc.)	1.3	3.7	95.0
<b>Parental Income**</b>			
Below #20,000	4.9	9.3	85.8
#21-40,000	5.3	5.9	88.8
#41,000+	2.3	3.6	94.1
<b>Child Employment Status**</b>			
Child working/assisting parent	8.8	13.2	78.0
Child owns business/working for self	3.8	9.0	87.2
<b>Child's Control of Earnings**</b>			
Child keeps monies made	3.5	9.4	87.1
Child gives parent money	9.7	12.9	77.4
** p < 0.01			
* p < 0.05			

In Table 5, the specific characteristics of the children, household structure, and parental socio-economic variables that are associated with children's occupational aspirations are presented. Our analysis for occupational aspirations produces identical results as those explained in Table 4. In summary, it is clear that children from higher socio-economic backgrounds desire to work in higher status positions. Similarly, children who live in modern family structure arrangements, such as nuclear or monogamous households, appear to have career goals in prestigious fields such as law, medicine, teaching etc. We also find that the smaller the household size, the higher the children's desire for professional occupations. Interestingly, children whose parents are Christians or were born in urban areas are significantly more likely to aspire to work in highest paying jobs than their counterparts whose parents practice Islam or Traditional religion or are native to rural areas. Finally, children's occupational aspirations are influenced by their ability to own their own business or control their earnings. Indeed, this study reveals that children who work for themselves and have independence in how they spend their money hope for the highest status positions such as lawyers, doctors, teachers etc.

**Table V:** Children's Occupational Aspirations as Determined by Children's Characteristics, Parental Socio-economic Status, and Family Structure Variables

	<b>Children's Career Aspirations</b>		
	<b>Trading/Business</b>	<b>Blue Collar/ Services</b>	<b>Professionals</b>
<b>Parental Education**</b>			
No Education	18.0	10.0	72.0
Elementary/Primary	16.5	7.4	76.1
Secondary	11.6	1.0	87.4
Post Secondary/College/University	7.3	2.4	90.3
<b>Parental Occupation**</b>			
Trading/Business	15.7	5.9	78.4
Blue Collar/Services	11.1	11.1	77.8
Professionals (Doctors, Teachers, etc.)	11.4	1.7	86.9
<b>Parental Income**</b>			
Below #20,000	14.0	13.6	72.4
#21-40,000	15.0	10.6	74.4
#41,000+	8.2	4.1	87.7
<b>Parental Family Structure*</b>			
Nuclear	14.1	5.0	80.9
Extended	16.3	8.3	75.4
<b>Parental Type of Marriage*</b>			
Monogamy	8.4	4.8	86.8
Polygyny	15.4	8.0	76.6
<b>Household Size**</b>			
0-4	6.0	13.7	80.3
5-9	16.2	4.0	79.8
10+	25.0	10.5	64.5
<b>Parental Religion*</b>			
Islam	17.0	7.0	76.0
Traditional Religion	23.0	2.2	74.8
Christianity	12.8	5.2	81.9
<b>Parental Place of Birth**</b>			
Rural	17.6	8.4	74.1
Urban	13.0	4.3	82.7
<b>Child Employment Status**</b>			
Child working/assisting parent	24.9	8.0	67.1
Child owns business/working for self	12.3	5.4	82.3
<b>Child's Control of Earnings**</b>			
Child keeps monies made	13.0	5.3	81.7
Child gives parent money	24.4	9.0	66.7
** p < 0.01			
* p < 0.05			

## **Discussion and Policy Recommendations**

This study draws on information provided by interviews with 1535 children and their parents in urban Nigeria to explore the dynamics of children's educational and occupational aspirations, as well as the goals their parents have for them. We pursue three major objectives in an attempt to enhance the understanding of this topic, especially in Nigeria, where few or no studies have been done. This study begins by comparing children's educational and occupational aspirations to those their parents wish for them. This is followed by an examination of whether gender differences exist in both the children's aspirations and goals that parents express for their children. Unlike most previous studies, this paper also includes information regarding the influence of specific characteristics of the children, parental socio-economic status, and household structure variables on educational and career goals of children. The argument is that a comprehensive knowledge about educational and occupational aspirations could serve as a useful means of predicting a country's human social capital formation and development.

Our findings indicate that an overwhelming proportion of children desire the highest educational and occupational goals. Parents also wish that their children would, in the future, attain the highest levels of education and work in the prestigious professional positions. Furthermore, this analysis reveals that the children's aspirations for both their education and employment parallel those expressed by their parents' for them. These findings have two implications. First, we can infer that the Nigerian society is in a state of flux and that the forces of modernization and Westernization have significant impact on Nigerians, especially in urban areas. As such, higher education and high status occupations are seen as priorities that need to be embraced. Second, these results demonstrate the efficacy and the parents' role as a powerful agent of socialization for children.

The effects of modernization are again reflected in the findings that show no evidence of gender bias in both the parent's aspirations for their children and in children's educational and career aspirations for themselves. We notice a radical departure from the traditional notion that boys receive higher education than girls and are therefore expected to work in more prestigious occupations. The fact that we detect gender neutrality in aspirations attests to the depth of the spread of universal acceptance of higher education and higher occupational status as cogent elements of both personal and societal development. This finding portrays the success of the feminist movements, the media, the government, and Non-Governmental Organizations in shaping the mentality of Nigerian parents regarding the essence of gender equities and promotion of access to higher educational and employment opportunities for both boys and girls.

The results of our study also demonstrate that parental socio-economic variables, such as education, occupation, and income, strongly influence children's educational and occupational aspirations. Thus, children who come from high socio-economic status backgrounds appear to have aspirations for educational qualifications and occupational status similar to their parents. Not surprisingly, this evidence corroborates outcomes of previous studies (Mbilinyi, 1969; Egmore, 1981; Smith and Cheung, 1986; Jamison and Lockheed, 1987; King and Lillard, 1987). Therefore, the findings suggest that educational opportunities, job creation at the professional level and commensurate salaries ought to be provided in order to bolster increased values for education and occupation. After all, the quality of today's children would determine the level of Nigeria's future success.

In addition, we find in our analysis that variables such as monogamy, nuclear household, Christian religion, and urban place of birth are all associated with the highest educational and occupational aspirations of children. Although these results are new contributions to the existing literature on this topic, these variables reflect the norms and cultural practices of the society which are not easily amenable to policy development. Given the complexity of Nigeria's ethnic-religious composition and diversity, legislations by the government that could promote monogamy, encourage nuclear family residence, or endorse Christianity cannot be considered or accepted. Therefore, we expect that individuals would initiate decisions in these areas on their own because it is not just nuclear residence, Christian faith, or monogamy that creates high educational and occupational aspirations per

se; rather, we believe that it is the potent effect of education that leads to values espoused by Christians and those within these family structure arrangements to desire such high levels of education and occupational status.

Finally, one major policy implication regarding the inverse relationship between household size and children's educational and career aspirations is that the knowledge, attitudes, and practice of family planning need to be encouraged by the Nigerian government and non-governmental organizations. It seems that such advocacy programs are necessary in order to reduce the rapidly growing population which tends to result in large household sizes. Since a small household size is commonly found among those with high levels of education, who tend to value the quality of their children and their future success, we suggest a promotion of family planning techniques to reduce population growth and avert its consequences, which could manifest in high educational and occupation aspirations for children.

Thus far, our study has shed lights on the influences of social-economic and demographic factors on children's educational and career goals. We would encourage future scholars to build on our study by considering the possibility of using a longitudinal data that obtains information about children's aspirations and then follows the children some years later in order to assess their attainments.

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# Bargaining Priorities in the New Economy: A survey of Malaysian Employee Unions

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## Abstract

Collective bargaining is seen as the instrument able to provide management and labour the means to achieve the ends. The understanding of how collective bargaining process and practice react under the pressure of change is of practical significant in the present trend in industrial relations and human resource management, which is placing greater concern on employee involvement, harmonious management-labour relations and on the practices that promote them. This article provides useful hints on what strategic choices to undertake when engaging in collective bargaining and achieving favourable bargaining outcomes as a response to the ever-changing bargaining environment.

**Keywords:** Bargaining priority, employee unions, industrial relations, Malaysia

## Introduction

Collective bargaining is the *raison d'être* for labour collective intervention into employers' decisions and practices (Scheuer, 1997). For management, collective bargaining is the linkage between industrial relations/human resources management and business strategies (Katz & Kochan, 2004). Jobert and Rozenblatt (1992) noted that changes in the economic circumstances and internationalisation of production have disrupted the familiar structure of bargaining in many countries. Beaumont (1990) viewed selected aspects of the external environment – namely, the labour market, the product market, the legislative and legal environment, and the larger societal and political context shapes the structures, processes, and outcomes of collective bargaining. These individual aspects of the environment will overlap and interact together in terms of their effects on the structures, processes, and outcomes of collective bargaining, so that it becomes a difficult task to disentangle their individual impact. Terry (1994) insisted that the changes in the institutional framework for bargaining are the result of legislation, pressures to reform existing systems of bargaining and consultation and interest among employees in new form of direct participation. On the other hand, Sussex (1989) reported structural changes in the underlying environment have modified the bargaining environment and organizational capacity of trade unions to obtain the best results that bargaining permit.

It is imperative for trade unions to respond to these challenging environments if they were to remain relevant and influential at the workplace. Most trade unions responded to the challenge in three ways: many failed to recognize it, some sought to oppose workplace change outright, and few accepted the changes, sometimes even embracing them but generally deferring to management in the details (Scannell, 1993). Unions that responded to the challenge by taking active role in shaping workplace

change and demanding a meaningful part in decision making process tended to benefit (Cohen-Rosenthal & Burton, 1993; Banks & Metzgar, 1989). Szapiro (1996) saw trade unions are increasingly adopting more sophisticated analyses of the change, setting agendas of their own and developing strategies for shaping change for the benefit of the working people. Other industrial relations scholars saw trade unions response to the changes in the environment as a phenomenon they referred to as union revival or union renewal or union reform ((Bronfenbrenner, 2004; Bronfenbrenner et al., 1998; Cradden and Jones, 2005; Lazes and Savages, 1996; Lipsig-Mumme, 1994; Rose and Chaison, 2001; Schenk, 2004; Yates, 2002, 2004).

Collective bargaining, specifically an industrial relations mechanism or tool, is now seen as a strategic option available to trade unions in their attempt to regain their former glory. The future goals and strategies in organising and bargaining to Lazes and Savage (1996) comprises of: (i) goals – employment security, better jobs, job creation, higher wages and sustained benefits, equity/due process and union-building; (ii) strategies – create new union agenda for change, bargain for greater say in business and economic decisions, bargain for compensation on new bases, develop new work system and rebuild and restructure unions. Whereas Lipsig-Mumme (1999) saw the need for the labour movement to adapt to the changing environment in order to survive and to adjust its goals, its practices, and its priorities in their organising and activism. Shenk (2004) on the other hand urged the union movement to revamp its priorities and put more resources into organising and bargaining. Kumar, Murray and Schetagne (1998a, 1998b) reported of trade unions revamping their bargaining priority to facilitate workplace change that benefit membership, improve the work environment and strengthen union influence in the workplace. Survey on bargaining experiences of national and international labour organisations in Canada conducted in 1997 revealed bargaining priorities are reflective of the adversity in the environment labour movement are facing. The bargaining priorities of the surveyed unions are the protection of current wages and benefits, and lay-off protection; the pursuance of traditional job control and instrumental items and active role in workplace change; on working conditions, job control and participative mechanism; and concerns gender, family issues and working time.

Another survey on 205 national and international trade unions in Canada by Kumar and Murray (2001; 2002) revealed that there was a relationship between the adversity in the environment and bargaining priorities of respondent unions. The bargaining priorities of the respondent unions according to them are the protection and improvement of wages and benefits; on pensions, mechanisms for protecting and enhancing employment security and the protection of workers from the stresses of the workplace; concerns role of union in workplace, protection for workers in the context of change, easing time pressures on individual workers and equity issues; and concerns question of work time, access to financial information, regulation of atypical employment and child care.

However, with regard to Malaysia, the dominant feature found in literature on collective bargaining in the country has been very limited and rather general in nature. The most prominent features of literature on collective bargaining in Malaysia is the debates on the high degree of State intervention in collective bargaining and the limitation of the scope of bargaining (Kassalow, 1978; Ayadurai, 1980; Sharma, 1989; Arudsothy, 1990; Arudsothy and Littler, 1993; Kuruvilla and Arudsothy, 1995; Anantaraman, 1997; *Todd and Peetz, 2001*). The main Act that regulates collective bargaining in Malaysia, the Industrial Relations Act 1967 is deemed to be prohibitive to certain aspect of collective bargaining in this country. Section 13 (3) of the Act prohibits the inclusion of items deemed to be managerial prerogatives – promotion, transfer, employment, termination by reason of retrenchment/reorganisation, dismissal and reinstatement and assignment or allocation of duties or tasks of any workman in the for a collective agreement. Collective bargaining is further curtailed under the Promotion of Investment Act 1986, which prohibits workers in pioneer industries from negotiating working conditions more favourable than the minimum standards provided for in the Employment Act 1955. The limitation imposed under the law implies that collective bargaining in Malaysia would be on bread and butter issues and where noble demands are conspicuously absent (Antaraman, 1997). When

pictured in a universalistic, deterministic and simplistic sense of a word, bargaining of this nature would be confined merely to only terms and conditions of employment. Ayadurai (1992) classified terms and conditions of employment regulating employment relationship covering both pecuniary and non-pecuniary terms and conditions that are regulated either by the Employment Act 1955 and its regulations, Industrial Relations Act 1967 or the outcomes of the Industrial Court awards. Pecuniary terms and conditions of employment cover wages and salaries, allowances, bonus and ex-gratia payments, and pecuniary benefits such as retrenchment benefit, retirement benefit, resignation benefit, maternity benefit, medical benefit and insurance benefit. Non-pecuniary terms and conditions of employment include hours of work (including overtime), rest day, public holidays, leave benefits such as annual leave, sick leave, maternity leave, and trade union leave, and miscellaneous benefits such as tea break, uniforms and shoes, prayer rooms and rest rooms.

The universalistic and simplistic approach on bargaining may perhaps has resulted trade unions in Malaysia becoming reactive where only bread and butter issues were raised during negotiation round with an absence of noble ideas. Conceivably these approaches in analyzing collective bargaining in the country are partly responsible for the dearth of industrial relations research in the Malaysian context. However taking the discourse taken by Bhopal and Rowley (2002) of shifting positions and division within and between actors in the industrial relations system – the State is not as homogeneous or deterministic body, Capital is not omni-powerful but is more contained, constrained and divergent, and Labour can resist and forge alliance. As highlighted by Dunlop (1958, 1988) the interaction between labour, management and the government are dynamic in nature and it is mind-boggling to think of the parties in the industrial relations system reacting in the same way under different circumstances in light of the constant change in the environment. We might postulate that Malaysian trade union movements are here to stay and would not be reactive of the change. As an institution, trade unions are given the strategic choice in order to adapt to the environment they are operating in. Child (1972) stated that organisational structure interacts with its environment rather than being totally determined by it. Whereas Chandler (1962) proposed that structure follows strategy. So the question to be answered is whether private sector employee unions in Malaysia are adapting their methods and priorities when bargaining in the new environment.

### **Review on bargaining priorities**

Traditionally the subjects or content of collective bargaining has been narrowly defined to terms and conditions of employment of members (Scheuer, 1997; Lazes and Savage, 1996). Salamon (1992) classified the content of collective bargaining into: (i) substantive rule – refer exclusively to those terms of employment such as wages, hours, holidays, etc, which can be converted into monetary terms. Others are fringe benefits such as pension, sick payment, etc; (ii) procedural rules – the outcome of negotiations over the exercise of managerial authority and decision-making. It cover the procedures in respect of grievances, discipline, redundancy, job evaluation, use of work study, etc; and (iii) working arrangements relating to such issues as manning levels, inter-job flexibility, time flexibility, use of contractors, and others. Begin and Beal (1989) identified subjects of collective bargaining to be both mandatory and non-mandatory. Mandatory subjects of bargaining to include: (i) wage compensation for services – wages, salaries, bonus, shift and overtime pay, rest days and holiday pays, etc; (ii) wage compensation for non-worked time – holidays, vacation, jury duty pay, funeral/bereavement pay, travel pay, severance pay, etc; (iii) non-wage benefits – holiday bonuses, pension benefits, profit sharing plans, stock purchase, medical life, sickness and accident plans, discounts on company products, etc; (iv) working conditions on the job – hours of work and work schedules, rest and lunch periods, plant rules of conduct, grievance procedures and arbitration, promotion, transfers, layoffs, recalls, workloads, discharge and discipline, safety and safety rules, probationary and trial periods, etc; (v) management rights and union-management issues – subcontracting, management right clause, effect on employees of plant closure, relocation, sale, union shop, dues check-off clauses, etc. Non-mandatory subjects of bargaining include definition of bargaining unit, conditions affecting supervisors,

performance bonds, union label, etc. Thus scope of collective bargaining as stated above is wide-ranging, which encompasses terms of employment, conditions of works, and relationships between parties to the contract agreement. However in relation to Malaysia, subjects or content or scope of collective bargaining is rather limited in nature (Kassalow, 1978; Ayadurai, 1980; Sharma, 1989; Arudsothy, 1990; Arudsothy and Littler, 1993; Kuruvilla and Arudsothy, 1995; Anantaraman, 1997; *Todd and Peetz, 2001*). Section 13 (3) of the IRA 1967 prohibits a trade union from including in its proposal for a collective agreement matters concerning recruitment/employment, promotion or transfer of any workman, the retrenchment of a workman by reason of redundancy or reorganisation, dismissal and reinstatement of a workman and the assignment or allocation of his duties and tasks. However the proviso under section 13 (3) permits unions to raise questions of general character relating to the procedure of promotion of workmen during bargaining negotiation. Thus it is not surprising when Anantaraman (1997) contended that collective bargaining relationship in new industrialising countries such as Malaysia are yet to become very mature. Subjects of bargaining are usually confined to “bread and butter” issues and the absence of any noble demands. Typical subjects of bargaining in Malaysia taking the cue from Ayadurai (1992) covers: (i) pecuniary terms and conditions - such as wages and salaries, allowances, bonus and ex-gratia payments and other monetary benefits; and (ii) non pecuniary terms and conditions – hours of work (including overtime), rest day, public holidays, leave benefits and miscellaneous non-monetary benefits. However in the new economy, unions’ interest extended to a level deeper than wages and working conditions. Strategies that unions have used in the past are no longer sufficient. Unions must develop contemporary approaches relevant to the current economic and institutional environment. According to Lazes and Savage (1996) bargaining demands now include critical decisions that affect workers’ employment security and wages, such as the strategy of the company, its allocation of resources, workplace organisation, the use of technology and other decisions about quality and productivity. They stipulated that trade unions must bargain for greater say in business and economic decisions and bargain for compensation on new bases. Lazes and Savage (1996) proposed the goals and strategies of trade union in the future as compared to the past (Table 1).

**Table 1:** Union goals and strategies

	<b>The Past</b>	<b>The Future</b>
<b>Goals</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Job security</li> <li>• Equity/due process</li> <li>• Higher wages, better benefits</li> <li>• Better working conditions</li> <li>• Union building/stronger union</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Employment security/better jobs</li> <li>• Job creation</li> <li>• Higher wages and sustained benefits</li> <li>• Equity/due process</li> </ul>
<b>Strategies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Job classification, work rules, and seniority</li> <li>• Grievance procedure</li> <li>• Collective bargaining</li> <li>• Contract administration</li> <li>• Provide services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create new union agenda for change</li> <li>• Bargain for greater say in business and economic decisions</li> <li>• Bargain for compensation on new bases</li> <li>• Develop new work systems</li> <li>• Rebuild and restructure unions</li> </ul>

Source: Lazes and Savage (1996: 101)

Lipsig-Mumme (1999) when defining union revival stated that the union movement need to continually adjust its goals, its practices, its priorities, its alliances in relation to the working class and the economic and socio-political world in which it operates, so that it continues to defend workers’ interests. Finally in relation to the present study, Kumar et al. (1988a; 1998b) and Kumar and Murray (2001; 2002) contended that given the adversity of the environmental change, trade unions would have to revamp their organizational and bargaining priorities in to facilitate workplace change that benefits membership, improves the work environment and strengthens the union influence in the workplace. Bargaining priority refers to the degree or level of importance attach to a list of items pursued during bargaining round. Kumar et al. (1988a; 1998b) classified bargaining priorities based on the bargaining

experience of the respondent unions in their study to include the protection of current wages and benefits, and lay-off protections, concern traditional job control, instrumental items and active role in workplace decisionmaking, concern wide range of working conditions, job control and participative mechanism, and concern gender, family issues, working time and flex time. Kumar and Murray (2001; 2002) identified bargaining priorities to include the protection and improvement of wages and benefits, concerns pensions, mechanisms for protecting and enhancing employment security and the protection of workers from the stresses of the workplace, concerns role of union in workplace, protection for workers in the context of change, easing time pressures on individual workers and equity issues, and on the question of work time, access to financial information, regulation of atypical employment and child care. In Malaysia, MTUC succinctly laid out the main priorities of the Malaysian workers and their trade unions priorities to include the following: (i) comprehensive social security, (ii) quality of life, (iii) right to speedy legal safeguards, (iv) commitment towards tripartism, and (v) strengthen justice and democracy. Thus there is evidence to indicate of Malaysian unions' priorities based on the above that encompasses elements such as the protection and improvement of wages and benefits, social security, health and safety, working time, maternity leave, day care and child care, work-life balance, education of workers, workplace consultation and cooperation and guarantee of workers' and unions' right. Could these be indicative of the adversity in the environment our labour movement is facing or the affect of other forces?

Taking several arguments into consideration, the present study intends to examine and reveal items prioritized during bargaining round. Would bread and butter issues such as the protection and improvement of wages and benefits covering both pecuniary and nonpecuniary terms and conditions of employment continued to dominate bargaining negotiation among the private sector employee unions in Malaysia? Would there be other issues that goes beyond bread and butter gaining in importance that would be reflective of the environment that organised labour in the country are operating in? Is the labour movement in Malaysia not reactive, too powerless to act or too easily to concede? Could they make strategic choices during bargaining round to gain their organisations some control over fundamental decision affecting the workplace and to achieve key unions' goals? Dunlop (1988) in his reference on the state of the labour movement in the United States quipped that the labour movement there is here to stay. It is adapting its methods to the new environment. Can the present study say the same in reference on the state of the labour movement in Malaysia?

## **Research Method**

A survey questionnaire was constructed to obtain information on the respondent unions bargaining priorities. The respondents were asked to evaluate the level of priority given to the 24 items in relations to the bargaining environment that they operate since the last bargaining round. The importance items pursued during the last bargaining round was categorized into four tiers of priorities: (i) first tier of priorities – the protection and improvement of wages and benefits; (ii) second tier of priorities – concerns pensions, mechanisms for protecting and enhancing employment security and the protection of workers from the stresses of the workplace; (iii) third tier of priorities – concerns role of union in workplace, protection for workers in the context of change, easing time pressures on individual workers and equity issues; and (iv) fourth tier of priorities – concerns question of work time, access to financial information, regulation of atypical employment and child care. Respondent were asked to evaluate the level of importance on a five-point Likert type scale ranging from “1= Not Very Important” to “5= Extremely Important”.

The target population for the present study is all 366 private sector employee unions in Malaysia as provided in the Malaysian Trade Union Directory 2005 (Department of Trade Union Affairs, MHR, 2005). However the rationalisation of the sample size in this study is determined by conducting a statistical power analysis as proposed by Cohen (1988, 1992). A stratified random sampling was adopted in order to ensure the representatives of the sample. A total of 278 self

administered questionnaires which represent 76 per cent of the target population were mailed to the respective private sector employee unions in Malaysia. A total of 90 valid responses were received, giving a response rate of 32.4 per cent. The collected data was tabulated and analyzed using SPSS.

## **Findings and Discussion**

Out of the four dimensions of collective bargaining priorities measured among the respondent unions, bargaining priorities concerning the protection and improvement of wages and benefits were given the highest priority. It score a mean rating of 4.45, where a whopping 94.0 per cent participating unions perceived them as 'very important' to 'extremely important'. Only 3.0 per cent considered protecting and improving wages and benefits as 'somewhat important' or 'not very important' or 'least important' respectively.

The second highest priority were accorded to bargaining priorities pertaining to the role of union in the workplace, protection for workers in the context of change, easing time pressure on workers and equity issues. This set of priorities were given a mean score of 3.62, where 52.0 per cent perceived them as 'very important' to 'extremely important', 39.0 per cent saw them as 'somewhat important' and only 9.0 per cent believed these set of items as 'not very important' or 'least important'.

The third highest priority was accorded to items related to pensions, mechanism for protecting and enhancing employment security and protection of individual workers from stressors of the workplace. With a mean score of 3.48, 45.0 per cent of the respondent unions believed the items as 'very important' to 'extremely important'. Another 44.0 per cent considered them as 'somewhat important' and 11.0 per cent noted that they are either 'not very important' or 'least important'.

Lowest priority was given to matters concerning question of work time, access to financial information, regulation of atypical employment and childcare. It scored a mean rating of only 2.62, where less than half (23.0 per cent) considered the set of items as 'very important' to 'extremely important'. Whereas 39.0 per cent believed them as 'somewhat important' and a considerable 38.8 per cent regarded them as 'not very important' to 'least important'.

**Table 2:** Perceived Bargaining Priorities

Bargaining Priorities (BP) Dimension	Percentage of Responses					
	A	B	C	D	E	F
<b>Bargaining priorities concerning protection &amp; improvement of wages and benefits (Y1)</b>	(1.0)	(2.0)	(3.0)	(39.0)	(55.0)	(4.45)
Increase wages and benefits	1.1	0.0	2.2	6.7	60.0	4.54
Protect current wages and benefits	1.1	4.4	3.3	40.0	51.1	4.36
<b>Bargaining priorities concerning pensions, mechanism for protecting and enhancing employment security and the protection of workers from stresses of workplace (Y2)</b>	(2.0)	(9.0)	(44.0)	(29.0)	(16.0)	(3.48)
Improve pensions and retirement provisions	4.4	3.3	28.9	24.4	38.9	3.90
Restrict contracting out/out-sourcing	4.4	8.9	37.7	32.2	16.7	3.48
Layoff protections	1.1	4.4	37.7	41.1	23.3	3.81
Control and regulate workloads	1.1	8.9	55.6	28.9	5.6	3.29
Improved training and retraining opportunities	1.1	5.6	50.0	33.3	10.0	3.46
Protection against harassment	1.1	13.3	44.4	44.4	12.2	3.38
Improved working hours/shift schedules	0.0	13.3	43.3	28.9	14.4	3.44
Family-related leaves	3.3	10.0	62.2	18.9	5.6	3.13
<b>Bargaining priorities concerning role of union in workplace, protection for workers in context of change, easing time pressure on individual workers and equity issues (Y3)</b>	(1.0)	(8.0)	(39.0)	(34.0)	(18.0)	3.62
Increase union role in workplace decision-making	0.0	2.2	22.2	47.8	27.8	4.01
Better severance pay	0.0	8.9	31.1	43.3	16.7	3.68
Employment equity	0.0	6.7	48.9	32.2	12.2	3.50
Consultation on/Advance notice of organizational change	0.0	5.6	25.6	48.9	20.0	3.83
Technological protection	0.0	14.4	33.3	36.7	15.6	3.53
Health and safety improvements	0.0	5.6	44.4	23.3	26.7	3.71
Guarantees of minimum level of employment	0.0	20.0	52.2	20.0	7.8	3.16
Merger/Amalgamation Protections and protocols	1.1	3.3	52.2	25.6	17.8	3.56
<b>Bargaining Priorities concerning question of work time, access to financial information, regulation of atypical employment and childcare</b>	(12.0)	(26.0)	(39.0)	(18.0)	(5.0)	2.62
Restriction on overtime	10.0	38.9	41.1	7.8	2.2	2.53
Access to financial information	10.0	18.9	47.8	20.0	3.3	2.88
Work time reduction	17.8	0.0	31.1	42.2	8.9	2.42
Control or regulate atypical employment	8.9	23.3	52.2	13.3	2.2	2.77
Flex time	8.9	34.4	36.7	14.4	5.6	2.73
Day care or other child care provisions	21.1	38.9	25.6	8.9	5.6	2.39

**Note:** A = Least important; B= Not very important; C= Somewhat important; D= Very important; E= Extremely important; F= Mean rating Figures in parentheses are composite score of each dimension

This finding differ in parts from the empirical evidence provided by Kumar et al. (1998a) and Kumar and Murray (2001) framework, which was used as a basis to understand bargaining priorities. They contended that matters relating to the role of union in the workplace, protection for workers in the context of change, easing time pressures for individual workers and employment equity as the second lowest priority. At least in Malaysia, these set of items were accorded second highest priority by our local unions and confirmed the underlying contention as to whether the above framework would be able to accurately described the state of unions' environment and its relationship with collective bargaining priorities in this country in light of a different playing field altogether.

Table 2 spelt out the details of the responses for each items in the dimension of collective bargaining priorities measured in this study. The improvement and protection of wages and benefits was given the highest priority by the respondent unions. A whopping 96.7 per cent of them rated increasing wages and benefits as 'very important' and 'extremely important'. Only 2.2 believed it as 'somewhat important' and 1.1 per cent noted it as 'least important'. Whereas the union function of protecting current wages and benefits is the next highest priority, with a resounding 91.1 per cent rating by respondent unions as 'very important' to 'extremely important'. Another 3.3 per cent considered

protecting wages and benefits as 'somewhat important', 4.4 per cent rated it as 'not very important' and 1.1 per cent regarded this item as 'least important'. The importance attached to these two items is of no surprise as it is the core defensive functions of unions. They are 'bread and butter issues' referred to by Anantaraman (1997) and are 'pecuniary terms and conditions' as coined by Ayadurai (1992). The result is also consistent with the argument by Lazes and Savage (1996) that higher wages and sustained benefits would continued to be relevant in the future as in the past. It also concurred with the statement by Kumar and Murray (1998) that the need for unions to concentrate on core defensive function of protecting and improving wages and benefits is to ensure continued membership support.

Respondent unions also gave a very high priority toward the need for unions to bargain for greater say in business and economic decisions. 75.5 per cent of them stated that increase role in workplace decision-making as 'very important' and 'extremely important'. This trend is in agreement with what Lazes and Savage (1996) contented that bargaining demands must be relevant to current economic and institutional environment, in which trade unions must bargain for greater say in business and economic decisions. However 22.2 per cent of the respondent unions perceived that increasing union role in workplace decision-making as 'somewhat important' and only 2.2 per cent considered it as 'not very important'.

With ever increasing restructuring and closure, merger and amalgamation in their respective industry as identified earlier by respondent unions, it is not surprising that layoff protection was perceived by 64.4 per cent of them as 'very important' to 'extremely important'. Another 30.0 per cent of respondents accorded it as 'somewhat important' and 5.5 per cent prioritised it as 'not very important' and 'least important'.

Another item identified as very high priority by respondent unions is the improvement of pensions and retirement provision. There are 63.3 per cent of respondent unions indicating this item as 'very important' and 'extremely important' during bargaining negotiation, 28.9 per cent seeing it as 'somewhat important', and 7.7 per cent as 'not very important' and 'least important'. This is in line with what MTUC (2005) considered as Malaysian workers and their unions priorities in light of their memorandum to the government for amendments to the EPF Act guaranteeing higher annual dividends and statutory retirement savings.

Items concerning protection for workers in the context of change such as better severance pay, advance notice on change and technological protection were also accorded very high priority. 68.9 per cent of the respondent unions identified consultation and advance notice on organisational change by management as 'very important' to 'extremely important', 25.6 per cent regarded it as 'somewhat important' and only 5.6 per cent looked at it as 'not very important'. Better severance pay was considered 'very important' and 'extremely important' by 60.0 per cent respondent unions, 'somewhat important' by 31.1 per cent of them and 'not very important' by only 8.9 per cent of the respondent unions. Technological protection was rated by 52.3 per cent of the respondent unions as 'very important' and 'extremely important', 33.3 per cent believed it was 'somewhat important' and 14.4 per cent perceived this item as 'not very important'.

Items such as work time reduction, health and safety improvements, and restriction on contracting-out and out-sourcing are regarded as a high priority by most of the respondent unions. 51.1 per cent of the respondents saw reducing work time as 'very important' and 'extremely important', with 31.1 per cent considered it as 'somewhat important' and another 17.8 per cent of the respondent unions regarded fighting to reduce work time as 'least important'. Improving occupational safety and health at the workplace is prioritised as 'very important' and 'extremely important' by 50.0 per cent of the respondent unions. 44.4 per cent of the respondent unions however stated that health and safety issue as 'somewhat important' and 5.6 per cent of them lightly regarded it as 'not very important'. Whereas 48.9 per cent of the respondent unions gave a thumb-up to the restriction of contracting-out and out-sourcing of members' work as 'very important' and 'extremely important' in their list of priorities. 37.7 per cent voted it as 'somewhat important' and only 13.3 per cent of the respondent unions viewed this item as 'not very important' and 'least important'.

Table 2 also demonstrates items perceived as ‘somewhat important’ but less pressing priorities by almost half or more by respondent unions. Items of less pressing priorities identified are family related leaves (62.2 per cent), control and regulate workloads (55.5 per cent), guarantees of minimum level of employment (52.2 per cent), closure/merger/amalgamation protections (52.2 per cent), control and regulate atypical employment (52.2 per cent) and access to financial information (47.8 per cent). Other items that are prioritised by respondent unions low in priority and least pressing cover a wide range of items concerning the question of work time and provisions in child-care and day care. An overwhelming majority of 60.0 per cent of the respondent unions considered provisions relating to child-care and day care as ‘not very important’ and ‘least important’ priority to be negotiated during bargaining round. 14.5 per cent of the respondent unions believed this issue as ‘very important’ and ‘extremely important’ and another 25.6 per cent looked at it as ‘somewhat important’. Since the law already regulates matters relating to the restriction on hours of work and overtime, it were deemed to be ‘not very important’ and ‘least important’ priority by 48.9 per cent of the respondent unions. A mere 10.0 per cent considered reducing overtime as ‘very important’ and ‘extremely important’ priority for their unions. Issue on flexi-time is also seen as a low priority with 43.3 per cent perceived it as ‘not very important’ and ‘least important’. Only 20.0 per cent looked upon it as ‘very important’ and ‘extremely important’ and 36.7 per cent noted flexi-time as ‘somewhat important’.

## **Conclusion**

The present research findings demonstrates that items related to the core defensive and protective functions of union – the protection and improvement of wages and benefits continued to be relevant in the present and future as it was in the past. They were given the highest priority by respondent private sector employee unions in Malaysia as what was accorded by their counterpart abroad. This echoed the sentiments by Lazes and Savage (1996), Kumar et al. (1998a), Kumar and Murray (2001) and Akyeampong (2005) that higher wages and sustained benefits is perennial issue, as it will ensure continued membership support. However it is high time for the labour movement in Malaysia to give equal or if not greater weight on items that would enable them to cope with continuously changing environment – the demand for greater labour market flexibility; economic, organizational and employment restructuring for greater efficiency and flexibility; and the changing demographics with greater diversity of needs and expectations among workers, which is specifically long-term in nature. According to Wong (2000) the trade union movement must broaden the role of trade unions beyond collective bargaining on terms and conditions at the workplace to that of a socio-economic movement contributing to workers’ well being in the wider community. Local unions should give high priority on items related to the enhancement of not only employment security but also employability of members through continuous and lifelong learning and acquiring of skills in the increasingly knowledge-driven industries in Malaysia. They should also bargain on issues whereby they could project union as adding value to employer through joint project in improvement productivity and efficiency at the workplace. Other areas are the promotion of work-life balance through social and recreational activities to help workers enjoy better life and lifestyle, which would contribute to productivity. Another is the provision of social safety nets in terms of affordable housing, health and safety, education and retirement plans.

It is anticipated that the findings of this study could offer a new context to test existing evidence and provide new insight into the area of analyzing collective bargaining practices in an era of ever changing environment be it political, economic, legal, technological, social or demographic changes. Unions will be able to make better strategic choices about what are the bargaining priorities and the expected gains that represent and promote workers’ interests through bargaining and daily activities at the workplace. Management on the other hand will be able addressed issues relevant to today’s highly competitive product market such as flexibility, adaptability, productivity, and efficiency without having to encroach into labour interests and rights.

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# Motivation and Productivity: Study of Civil Servants in Rivers State, Nigeria

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## Abstract

This research examined the productivity and motivation of civil servants in Rivers State, Nigeria. In order to carry out a meaningful study, a case study approach was adopted and the source of data obtained was survey. In the course of this study, statements of problem and research questions were outlined. Based on this research questions, two hypotheses were tested using Chi-Square statistical techniques. A sample of two categories of civil servants namely: Junior and Senior staffs in Rivers State were randomly selected and a total of 60 copies of questionnaires administered and only 40 respondents completed and returned their questionnaires. The techniques adopted in the analysis of the data were percentages, averages, and Chi-Square statistical technique. The findings reveal that majority respondents stated that the motivational strategies adopted by management of civil servants has significant effect in enhancing workers productivity, majority of the respondents stated that challenging work influences their level of productivity. Based on our findings, we recommended that Rivers State Government should take the interest of civil servants into consideration in its corporate planning in terms of allowances payments. In conclusion, it was established that the motivational strategies adopted by management in motivating civil servants in Rivers State has significant effect in enhancing workers productivity.

**Keywords:** Motivation, productivity, job, and satisfaction.

## Introduction

The role that civil servants in Rivers State, Nigeria perform is determined not only by their individual values, drives, motives, and sentiments but also by the manner in which civil servants in Rivers State relates to their groups. Relations with co-workers, supervisors, and community may often influence what motives a person to produce or restrict production, remain on the job or leave or absent himself from work. These social forces may be stronger than certain isolated incentives offered by management which are interpreted by the workers as “out of context”. Work is being described as a central feature of life in modern society as asserted by Davies and Shackleton (1975). Really, our sense of personal worth is closely connected to the feeling that we are accomplishing something purposeful with our lives. Many achievements, oriented, intelligent observers of Nigerian people at work have always come out with a common impression that generally, civil servants in Rivers State are diligent and hardworking in their approach at workplace. These workers like hearing anybody talk about efficiency, dedication, honesty, competence, determination and productivity all of which characterizes high achievement people in production-oriented society.

The needs of civil servants in Rivers State, it must be emphasized are not entirely different from one society to another, especially in our contemporary society. All workers and indeed, humans, in general are motivated by one need or another, or a combination of needs towards some goals or objectives. In order to be able to influence the workers to perform creditably, effectively, efficiently and honestly one should be able to analyze, understand and come to terms with the factors necessary to instigate or motivate the individuals to act in a particular direction in certain circumstances.

Ikeagwu(1984), has suggested that there is a pervasive culture nonchalance, indifferent, laziness and lethargy, which has culminated in the low productivity and low performance of the Nigerian workers. Coupled with this colonial legacy, is the fact that there have been a lot of changes since independence. The needs of the workers in the colonial times would therefore be different from those of today. The refusal of government and private employers to meet the evolving and fast changing needs of workers has caused a severe lapse in our economy and the prevailing work culture in the country.

This has also led to various agitation by workers in various sector of the economy for fulfillment of their needs, culminating in many individual upheavals from the Enugu shooting of 1949; through the general strike of 1964, the Dockworkers strike of 1964, the general strike 1981, to the recent spates of incessant and protracted strikes, work-to-rule and mass protests by various trade union and industrial workers in their agitation for more satisfactory conditions, better remuneration and related incentives. It is therefore very essential to examine productivity and motivation of civil servants in Rivers State, Nigeria.

### **Statement of the Problems**

The average civil servants in Rivers State, whether in public or private sector is often accused of a carefree attitude to work, lack of dedication to duty, outright inefficiency, unproductiveness and laziness. It is in view of the above that motivated the study of this research. For example, workers have to be motivated if an organization's goal is to increase productivity.

The major problems confronting this study is that civil servants in Rivers State are Poorly motivated by management on the job and they react negatively by not improving on productivity. Productivity measured in terms of worker output can affect any organization in two ways. It is either negative or positive. This is because output is linked in a direct way to capital accumulation. Thus when productivity is on the increase, it affects the organization positively, since it will not only be able to meet overhead commitment, but also be able to declare some profits. In a situation where productivity is on the low side, it has a negative impact on the organization. The employment and sustenance of a well-motivated workforce is from the foregoing not debatable.

Studies have not been able to establish a simple and direct relationship between motivation and productivity among civil servants in Rivers State. Particular assumptions have failed to produce the same results in varying industrial settings.

The main purpose of this research includes:

- 1) To examine the relationship between productivity motivation of civil servants in Rivers State.
- 2) To analyze carefully the strategy of management of Rivers State government with particular reference to workers motivation.
- 3) To demonstrate that the inability of management to meet workers' needs and aspiration may have an adverse effect on the performance of workers.
- 4) To relate motivation and productivity of civil servants in Rivers State and also examine how these two variables are affected by management.

## **Literature**

### **Concept of Productivity**

The term productivity has diverse interpretations. This is so because productivity is a generic word, which admits many varieties, contexts and circumstances. In a broad sense, productivity could be visualized as management euphemism for the identification, quantitative description, evaluation and control of function systems or purposeful activities. In motivation, productivity is all round. That is, if more can be achieved with the available people and physical resources, which is higher productivity. In quantity terms, productivity is the ratio of output in the form of goods and services produced and input of anyone or all of the resources utilized in turning out these services. These resources may be in the form of man, materials, money, machines, land and power to mention a few. Simply put therefore, productivity is that relationship of some volume of output to the volume of input. Behavioural scientists are inclined to consider such performance measure as personal turnover, absenteeism, accident rate, and grievances as productivity criteria as much as such measures as production rate or quality items produced. In other words, the term productivity depicts such things as labour productivity; annual output per worker, and holding quality constant has grown lied to the more flexible interpretation of the meaning. In all however, productivity comes fairly close to be all embracing. In an organization or of an individual productivity does not occur. It is an experience that has to take place as a result of purposeful motivation.

### **Concept of Motivation**

The concept of motivation is derived from the Latin word “movers” which means, “to move”, therefore one can say literally that motivation is the process of arousing movement in the organism. Taylor (1905), was the first management theorist to concern himself with motivation and is the Father of Scientific inherently and lazy. They only respond if given financial reward and supervised. This idea was also supported by Adam Smith and Porter and Lawler in their respected books. Vroom, (1982) using money as a motivator to motivate behaviour, said employees must both desire it and believe that it will be forthcoming if they behave in the manner prescribed.

Ajiola (1984) does not agree with Taylor’s theory. According to him, motivation is the process of stimulating people to action in achieving desired goals. On the contrary, motivation according to Okojwu (1984) is the way in which human beings direct or explain their behavioural if certain needs are clearly unsatisfied, while Jones, (1955) is of the view that it has to do with how behaviour gets started, is energized, sustained, directed, stopped and what kind of subjective reaction is present in the organization while all these are going on. This can be identified at any point in time.

Nadler and Lawler (1983) in their write up show that the practical application of these theories could not stand the test of time in some situations. Motivation in general applied to the entire classes of drives, desires, needs, wishes and similar forces, Keith, (1981) said that almost all conscious behaviour is motivated and the employer should identify and activate employees’ motives towards task performance. Nwokoye (1981) in his contribution contended that motivation is a driving force behind behaviour and it is often used synonymously with needs, wishes and desires.

An employee keep on maintaining or increasing productivity if the motivating factors are given and that made Ejiogu, (1981) to say the more any of these motivating factors are provided, the greater the motivation. The behaviour that is perceived and rewarded will tend to be repeated while the behaviour that is unrewarded will be distinguished.

### **Employees’ Motivational Techniques Adopted by Management**

Motivation is the factor of management that insures overall efficiency, effectiveness, standard performance and mutual understanding. However, one of the most difficult tasks of management in Nigeria is that of motivating its employees (managerial and non-managerial) to perform the work

assigned to them in a manner that meets or surpasses expected standard of performance. Motivation techniques are sometimes based on culture and for the fact that there exist cultural differences between the Western societies and the traditional African societies, especially Nigeria, with a diverse cultural background, these theories cannot be effectively applied to the Nigeria work situation.

Attempts have been made by Nigerian scholars to research into the motivation of Nigerian workers. One of such attempts was an empirical study into the behavioural or workers at the Nigerian workplace know to have been conducted by Oloko (1973), which he called “Muddy Water”. His finding was that the workers at “Muddy Water” attach much importance to being friendly with their bosses instead of working hard for the company as a means to growth and development on the job.

Olokos (1973), study was seriously criticized by Ahiauzu (1984) as having many shortcoming amongst which is its limitation to the Western part of Nigeria alone – where the study was conducted and secondly, it was predominated by Yoruba culture which in the critics view was too restrictive and could not be generalized as there exists a variety of culture amongst the Nigerian ethnic groups.

In concluding his own research work, Ahiauzu (1984) tried to identify specific motivational techniques adopted by managers at the workplace and his research work was conducted within Agricultural firms. However, there has not been any acceptable motivational theory by a Nigerian as it affects the Nigerian workplace. According to Ahiauzu (1984) it is surprising to find that most literature by Nigerian writers on how to motivate Nigerian workers are mainly reviews of general motivation theories developed by well-known western theorists.

Many theories have already been proposed and in broad terms, these various theories have been classified into 2 (two) categories: Content theory and Process theory Campbell et al (1970). Content theory of motivation assumes that the motivation process is built on the foundation of an unsatisfied need that the answer to any motivational problem lies in a more complete understanding of the context of the situation or of the people involved. Process theory on the other hand, views motivation as more externally induced; this attempt to understand how individuals determine the amount of effort to exert. Perhaps we can better understand these two (2) classifications by investigating or reviewing some of the various well-known theories that fall into each one.

Herzberg’s idea provoked much controversy and his theory has been discredited for a variety of reasons.

- a. They imply a general applicability and do not seem to take enough account of Individual differences.
- b. His data, which are limited, do not support it.
- c. Other data do not support it.

King (1970) and Gardner (1977) in reviewing the work undertaken by Herzberg Insistence that motivation comes from within each individual and that managers cannot truly motivate but can stimulate or strife motivation, is nevertheless an important contribution to this study.

## **Organizational View of Productivity**

The biggest problem that is faced by any person who is placed in charge of the management of any resource is the problem of how to maintain, sustain, or raise productivity. The utilization of resources often raises the problem of economic use. For an activity to be regarded as productive, the ratio between inputs, and service must be positive. An attempt will be made hereunder to define the term productivity, as it is understood today and to apply the definition of Nigerian situation so as to determine why most Nigerian workers have problem with it. Over the years, many different views of productivity have been developed and these views have contributed to confusion and obscurity about its nature. Productivity is not production, nor is it performance, nor is it results nor outcome. These three variables are components of productivity efforts, but they are not equivalent terms.

Productivity therefore is the arithmetic ratio between the amount produced and the amount of any resources used in the course of production. An increase in the services of labour compare with the cost of labour indicates that labour is productivity. This may be due to the skill of the workers, the

machines or the materials used or combination of the factors. No matter how we look at productivity often implies that there is incremental gain in what is produced as compared with the expenditure or resources utilized. In spite of this fact, productivity can be easily defined as the ratio services and input. What productivity really is or how it can be measured has always provoked a great deal of disagreement and controversy among experts. This is because productivity is an evasive phenomenon and its casual effects are difficult to determine.

Traditionally, most people associate productivity with production and manufacturing because that is what it is most visible and measurable. Economists have supported this view by defining productivity as output per labour cost. In business, productivity is a measurement of business success. It is measured by the entrepreneur through operational performance result. Turnover result, sales volume, income and dividend declared to shareholders and the quality/quantity of service to the community. As a matter of fact, productivity touches all of us as consumers, taxpayers, citizens and members of organizations. Given the various or series of explanations of productivity, there is still a need for a broad definition which seems to be satisfied by Mali, (1978) attempt. This author defines productivity as: "The measure of how well resources are brought together in an organization and utilized for accomplishing a set of results. Productivity is reaching the highest level of performance with the least expenditure of resources". There are two parts to this definition. The first part is a set of results or performance. Performance or accomplishing a set of results refer to the effectiveness in reaching a mission, a planned achievement or a need value, without serious regard for the costs incurred in the process. Certainly, accomplishing a set of results is by far the most important focus of the productivity concept, because without a set of results, there is no productivity.

The second part of the definition implies that consuming resources, without which achievements are not likely to happen and productivity cannot exist. It specifies the number, type and level of resources needed. Example of such resources includes plant capacity, costs, raw materials, personnel, facilities, capital, technology, budgets, supplies and information. How well these resources are brought together refers to the efficiency of achieving results with minimum expenditure of the resources. High productivity suggests minimum use of resources. It is on this basis that Kuper, (1975) defines productivity as a combination of effectiveness and efficient. A basic prerequisite for productivity improvement is that both the output and the input be measurable. Therefore, the measurement of these two dimensions is crucial in any productivity effort.

### **Organizational Views of Motivation/Remuneration**

The advanced countries like Britain, America, and etc emphasis have shifted from the extrinsic factors of motivation, such as pay, promotion and the likes to intrinsic factors such as achievement, recognition and self actualization. In developing countries like Nigeria for example, motivation to work still rest on the lowest level of survival and security such as clothing and shelter. It is a known fact that no matter how good or efficient an organization is, nothing happens in the line of productivity, until workers are properly motivated to perform.

Unfortunately, remuneration of labour which includes wages, fringe benefits, allowances for health care, transportation, and housing are grossly inadequate in the Nigerian system especially the civil service and other public enterprises with the private sector standing out as an exception. This affects productivity levels negatively. Anikpo, (1984) in his attempt to identify the needs of the Nigerian. On the first theoretical consideration, there is tactic acceptance that the Nigerian workers have no needs, all or some of which are either satisfied or not. This he said arose from the fact that despite the fair wages and amenities, the Nigerian workers still perform below expectation. Fashina (1984) writing on the theories of motivation and the Nigerian situation hold a similar view. It is very disheartening that despite the various demand of the Nigerian workers for better service conditions, the situation still remain the same. Nigerian workers are still performing very much below expectation.

The arguments put forward here by Anikpo and Fashina have it that the poor productivity associated with the Nigerian workers is not due to lack of adequate incentives or motivation but as a

result of the general indifferences among Nigerian workers. Fashina, (1984) also said that the Nigerian workers have not met the challenges of our modern time. He said that the working force of our nation is sick from the root to the branches, and as a result the nation's economy is going down the stream. He also said that "the Nigerian workers are shying away from their responsibilities, while the common people suffer".

### **Mismanagement of Resources**

A good number of Nigerian workers are said to be dishonest to their employers. They do not depend on the principles of an honest pay for a normal day's job. This practice where highly placed officials deploy public funds for personal use is prominent in the Nigerian society. There is no doubt this affects productivity. Mordi, (1984) wrote that "this mismanagement of human resources strikes one everywhere ...at the ministries where half of the workers are not on seat and said to be either at the toilet or carrying files or have traveled". The above example is a clear indication of what is found in the public sector, Mordi (1984). Situations where corruption and poor work moral constitute the ethics of a society raise more fundamental issues of management techniques.

### **Staff Training and Development**

Staff training and development is an important function performed by the personnel management department, both the private and public sectors of the Nigerian economy. But lapses have been observed in the public sector. Banjoko (1987) wrote that "in the Nigerian public sector, any noticeable appreciation of the importance of training is only recent. Even then training is generally not a highly developed function in most public personnel programmes". Also, the writer contended that even when workers are sent for training, no one really knows what is gained, owing to the absence of any systematic evaluation of the training and development of such programmes.

The closed system of appraisal whereby the boss does the evaluation and grading and keeps it secret from employees has been the normal practice of the Nigerian public sector. This practices has drawn the condemnation of some writers. Fashioyi (1987) state that while this method has not helped in stimulating improved performance, it has served as a cover for many surreptitious actions of the superiors, besides complaints about the veracity and objectivity of many appraisal reports have been wide spread. Most objectivity of appraisal, report whose emphasis is personal traits instead of job-related behavior and performance. According to the report of the Public Service Commission (1984), the greatest criticism against the present appraisal system is that it ignores one of its major purposes, which is improved of individual performance.

Generally, appraisal reports are supposed to serve two purposes; development and evaluation. Appraisal reports help in identifying area of weakness or deficiencies, which would serve as a basis for initiating training and development programmes that would erase the deficiencies. In the evaluating role, appraisal reports serve as a guide to personnel actions like promotions, discipline, dismissal, and salary increase. But the reverse is the case in Nigeria. Bamoke (1987), wrote that in Nigeria Public Service, appraisal reports are currently becoming nothing. Other than passports to promotions of stagnation. Because politics, tribalism, "statism", nepotism, and favoritism, promotions in Nigeria are not based on objectives and merits. In many sectors and organizations, there are no objective principles for fair evaluation of workers abilities. Positive results would be achieved from evaluation efforts, if public personnel managers would be more open hearted in their practices.

### **Methodology**

The target population of the study includes all civil servants in Rivers State, Nigeria. This enabled us to conduct a proper research on the productivity and motivation of civil servants in Rivers State, Nigeria. The population was divided into two categories of civil servants namely, junior and senior staffs. The

sample of this study is civil servants in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria. The random sampling technique was used and by the researcher's judgment, a sample of sixty (60) civil servants was selected from the two categories. The instrumentation employed in collecting data is the questionnaire. It is designed to elicit information on productivity and motivation of the civil servants. The questionnaire is divided into two sections, the first section deals with personal information about the respondent. The second deals with the extent of productivity and motivation of the civil servants. The questionnaire is mostly of the multiple-choice types and required respondents to indicate YES or NO, against each item.

The data generated from the use of questionnaire are analyzed through the use of descriptive methods such as percentages and averages, and statistical tools. For the purpose of this study, the statistical tool adopted to analyze the data is the Chi-square. The purpose of the Chi-Square analysis is to test and determine how significant the observed data differs from the expected outcome. The alternative hypothesis is accepted if the calculated Chi-Square value is greater than tabulated Chi-Square value and when the calculated value is less than the tabulated value, the null hypothesis is accepted at a given level of confidence. For the purpose of this study, the level of confidence is 95%, indicating an alpha risk of 0.05.

## Results

### Presentation of Data and Discussion

A total of 60 copies of the questionnaires were administered to selected two categories of civil servants in Rivers State. Out of the 60 copies administered, only 40 respondents promptly completed and returned their copies of the questionnaires. The returned 40 copies represent the sample size of the study. The analysis of the questionnaire distribution and response rate are presented in table 4.2 and 4.3 below:

**Table 4.2:** questionnaire Administered Source:

S/N	Selected Categories of Civil servants in Rivers State, Nigeria	Questionnaire Administered
1	Junior Staff	30
2	Senior Staff	30
	<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>

Research Data, 2007

**Table 4.3:** Response Rate

S/N	Selected Categories of Civil Servants in Rivers State	Respondents	% of Respondents
1	Junior Staff	25	63
2	Senior Staff	15	37
	<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Research Data, 2007

### Data Presentation and Analysis

(A) Motivational Strategies Adopted by Management. The respondents were asked whether the motivational strategies adopted by management of civil servants has effect in enhancing workers productivity. The response received is shown in Table 4.5 below.

**Table 4.5:** Does Motivational Strategies Adopted by Management Enhances Workers Productivity.

S/N	Selected categories of Civil Servants in Rivers State	Yes	No	% of Respondents
1	Junior Staff	18	7	63
2	Senior Staff	10	5	37
	<b>Total</b>	<b>28(70%)</b>	<b>12(30%)</b>	<b>100%</b>

Sources: Research Data, 2007

The above data shows that majority, 28% (70%) respondents stated that the motivational strategies adopted by management of civil servants has significant effect in enhancing workers productivity, while 12(30%) respondents stated that motivational strategies adopted by management of civil servants has no significant effect in enhancing workers productivity.

### Needs to be satisfied most

Respondents were asked the needs they would want to be satisfied most. The responses received are shown in Table 4.6 below:

**Table 4.6:** Which of the following needs would Respondents wants to be satisfied most?

S/N	Selected categories of civil servants in Rivers State	Self Actualization	Self-Esteem	Social needs	Safety and security needs	% of Respondents
1	Junior Staff		15	10		63
2	Senior Staff		3	2	10	37
	<b>Total</b>		<b>18(45%)</b>	<b>12(30%)</b>	<b>10(25%)</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Research Data, 2007

The above data shows that majority, 18 (45%) respondents agreed that the most satisfying need is self-esteem, 12 (30%) respondents agreed that the most satisfying need is social needs, while 10 (25%) respondents agreed that the most satisfying need is safety and security needs.

### The Effect of Extrinsic Intrinsic Factors in Motivation

Respondents were asked whether the extrinsic and intrinsic factors affecting civil servants in Rivers State have effect in determining their level of motivation. The responses received are shown in Table 4.7 below:

**Table 4.7:** Does the Extrinsic and Intrinsic Factors Affecting Civil Servants determine their level of motivation?

S/N	Selected categories of Civil Servants in Rivers State	Yes	No	% of Respondents
1	Junior Staff	14	11	63
2	Senior Staff	13	2	37
	<b>Total</b>	<b>27(67%)</b>	<b>13(33%)</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Research Data, 2007

The above data shows that majority, 27 (67%) respondent stated that extrinsic and intrinsic factors affecting civil servant in Rivers State has significant effect in determining the level of motivation, while 13 (33%) respondent stated that the extrinsic and intrinsic factors affecting civil servants in Rivers state has no significant effect in determining the level of motivation.

### The Effect of Challenging Work

Respondents were asked whether challenging work influences their productivity level. The responses received are shown in Table 4.8 below:

**Table 4.8:** Does Challenging Work influence their productivity level?

S/N	Selected categories of Civil Servants in Rivers State	Yes	No	% of Respondents
1	Junior Staff	21	4	63
2	Senior Staff	14	1	37
	<b>Total</b>	<b>35(87%)</b>	<b>5(13%)</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Research Data, 2007

The above data shows that majority, 70(87%) respondents stated that challenging work influences their level of productivity, while 10(13%) respondents stated that challenging work does not influence their productivity level.

### **The Effect of Free Medical/Services**

Respondents were asked whether free medical services influenced their level of productivity. The responses are shown in Table 4.9 below:

**Table 4.9:** Does Free Medical Services Influences your level of productivity?

S/N	Selected categories of Civil Servants in Rivers State	Yes	No	% of Respondents
1	Junior Staff	16	9	63
2	Senior Staff	8	7	37
	<b>Total</b>	<b>24(60%)</b>	<b>16(40%)</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Research Data, 2007

The above data shows that majority, 24(60%) respondents stated that free medical services influences their level of productivity, while 16(40%) respondents stated that free medical services does not influence their productivity level.

### **The Effect of Good Working Environment**

Respondents were asked whether good working environment influences their productivity level. The responses are shown in Table 4.10 below:

**Table 4.10:** Does Good Working Environment influences your level of Productivity?

S/N	Selected categories of Civil Servants in Rivers State	Yes	No	% of Respondents
1	Junior Staff	13	12	63
2	Senior Staff	4	11	37
	<b>Total</b>	<b>17(43%)</b>	<b>23(57%)</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Research Data, 2007.

The above data shows that majority, 23(57%) respondents stated that good working environment does not influence their level of productivity, while 17(43%) respondents stated that good working environment influences their level of productivity.

### **Hypotheses Testing**

This sub-section presents a report of the two hypotheses tested using 95% level of confidence and degree of freedom (df) = 1.

#### **Test 1**

**HO1:** The motivational strategies adopted by management in motivating civil servants in Rivers State have significant effect in enhancing workers productivity. The relevant data appears in Table 4.12 below:

**Table 4.12:** Computation of test 1

Responses	Observed O	Expected E	O-E	(O-E) <sup>2</sup>	$\frac{(O-E)^2}{E}$
Yes	28	20	8	64	3.2
No	12	20	-8	64	3.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>			<b>X<sup>2</sup> = 6.4</b>

Source: Research Data, 2007

The above table shows that:

Chi-square calculated = 6.4

Chi-square Table value = 3.84 (95% level of confidence and (df) = 1)

**Decision Rule:** Since the chi-square calculated is greater than chi-square table value, we accept the Alternative (H<sub>A</sub>) hypothesis and reject Null (H<sub>0</sub>) hypothesis. This means that the motivational strategies adopted by management in motivating civil servants in Rivers State have significant effect in enhancing workers productivity.

### Test 2

**HO2:** The extrinsic and intrinsic factors affecting civil servants in Rivers State have significant effect in determining the level of motivation.

The relevant data appears in Table 4.13 below:

**Table 4.13:** Computation of Test 2

Responses	Observed O	Expected E	O-E	(O-E) <sup>2</sup>	$\frac{(O-E)^2}{E}$
Yes	27	20	7	49	2.5
No	13	20	-7	49	2.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>			<b>X<sup>2</sup> = 5.0</b>

Source: Research Data, 2007.

The above data shows that:

Chi-square calculated = 5.0

Chi-square table value = 3.84 (95% level of confidence and (df) = 1)

**Decision Rule:** Since the Chi-square calculated is greater than the chi-square table value, we accept Alternative (H<sub>A</sub>) hypothesis and reject Null (H<sub>0</sub>) hypothesis. This means that the extrinsic and intrinsic factors affecting civil servants in Rivers State has significant effect in determining the of motivation.

### Discussion of Findings

From the fore-going data analysis, the findings of the study are:

- (i) Majority, 28(70%) respondents stated that the motivational strategies adopted by management of civil servants have significant effect in enhancing workers productivity.
- (ii) Majority, 18(43%) respondents agreed that the most satisfying need is self-esteem.
- (iii) Majority, 27(67%) respondents stated that the extrinsic and intrinsic factors affecting civil servants in Rivers state have significant effect in determining the level of motivation.
- (iv) Majority, 35(87%) respondents stated that challenging work influences their level of productivity.
- (v) Majority, 24(60%) respondents stated that free medical services influence their level of productivity.
- (vi) Majority, 23(57%) respondents stated that good working environment does not influence their level of productivity.

## **Summary**

In developing countries like ours for example, motivation to work still rest on self-esteem, social needs and safety/security needs. It is a known fact that no matter how good or efficient an organization is, nothing happened in the line of productivity, until workers are properly motivated to perform. Unfortunately, remuneration of labour which includes wages/fringe benefits and allowance for health care, transportation, and housing are grossly inadequate in the Nigerian system especially with the private sector standing out as an exception. Productivity simply put is the arithmetic ratio between the amount of any resources used in the cause of production. Today, a major problem of our society is how to find solutions of the negative attitude of civil servants and others alike, found in both the public and private sector, and how to raise the relative low productivity which this trend generates. It is a known fact that no matter how good or efficient an organization is, nothing happens as far as productivity is concerned until the people who make-up such organization are properly motivated to perform. Unfortunately, remuneration which includes wages, fringe benefits and allowance for transport, health and housing are grossly inadequate in the Nigerian system, more especially as it affects the civil service and other public institutions and private organizations. A critical examination of the existing literature reveals that at present, the organization of public personnel functions is disjointed, fragmented and grossly uncoordinated. The situation is better in the private sector. The greatest criticism against present appraisal system in Nigeria is that it ignores one of its major purposes – the improvement of individual performance.

## **Conclusion**

Based on the results of the data analysis, the main conclusions of the study are, (1) It was established that the motivational strategies adopted by the management in motivating civil servants in Rivers State, Nigeria has significant effect in enhancing workers productivity. (2). It was established that the extrinsic and intrinsic factors affecting the employees has significant effect in determining the level of motivation.

## **Recommendation**

In order to enhance productivity and motivation of the civil servants, we make the following recommendations: (1) The Rivers State Government should take the interest of the civil servants into consideration in its corporate planning in terms of allowances payment. (2) The State government should create a good organization structure, providing for clear lines of communication, authority, and accountability in order to increase production. (3) Civil servants in Rivers State should be remunerated as to solve their immediate financial problems; otherwise he or she is not likely to be committed to his job.

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# Reform for Whom? An Evaluation Over the Health Sector in Turkey

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## Abstract

Although health sectors in the world have very different structural features, actually, it has been seen that health policy has become clear in two separate alternatives. One of these alternatives is the policy considering health as “social fact”, healthy life and medical care as “a fundamental humanity right acquired innately”, medical services as “a social duty and responsibility”. This policy, like in all fundamental rights, gives the responsibility and duty of fulfillment of health right requirements the public, state which is its organized power. Another alternative is the policy considering health as “an individual fact”, defining fulfillment of the requirements of health right not as a social duty but as “an individual responsibility” and giving completely fulfillment of this right to the rules of supply and demand of the market. In Turkey, health services were handled as a privileged state duty for quite a long time, however, a great transformation was began to come out within the efforts of carrying out enlargement strategy free to the abroad also by the influence of globalization in Turkey after 1980 and a period of privatization was began in the field of health. Two significant sections of Program of Transformation in Health are family medicine and general health insurance.

But, reforms planned to be realized in the field of health in Turkey, will not solve the problems in the health sector, they even will deepen available inequalities. Therefore, the fact that in what extent these reforms planned to be realized in the field of health in Turkey are compatible with the economical and social structure of Turkey should be examined.

**Keywords:** Health sector, health reform, organization in health, health financing, family medical science, general health insurance.

## I. Introduction

When having a view of several countries in the world, it is seen that health sector has been structured very differently, has separate structural features and of these features, none of them are resembled the other. Besides different countries, even health services in the same country but in different regions and departments have different structural features. These create an impression that there are a great variety of health policies. However, actually, there are not many and various health policies as supposed. When these structures are examined in detail and carefully, it has been seen that health policies arose from two separate philosophies and therefore they have come into a true picture in two separate alternatives [1].

One of these alternatives is the policy considering health as “social fact”, healthy life and medical care as “a fundamental humanity right acquired innately”, medical services as “a social duty

and responsibility". This policy, like in all fundamental rights, gives the responsibility and duty of fulfillment of health right requirements the public, state which is its organized power. It handles health services as "a means of social solidarity and redistribution of national income" and it envisages equality for benefiting of services. The other alternative is the policy considering health as "an individual fact, therefore defining fulfillment of the requirements of health right not as a social duty but as "an individual responsibility" and by giving completely fulfillment of this right to the rules of supply and demand of the market, envisaging the fact that people benefit from this right "in proportion of their opportunities". These policies consider health services as "profit instrument" [1].

These two separate philosophies composing the basic of health policies designate the financing, organization and material structure as human force of the health sector; namely, it designates all other sub-policy and their practices and therefore the structure of the sector. For example, health policies arising from the first alternative considers public organizations and their departments for its service presentation while financing health services by the public funds (general budget and public insurance) by bringing social solidarity in the foreground.

The health policy arising from the second alternative considers paying by individually or private insurance as a financing way; it prefers private organizations and establishments for its service presentation.

In Turkey, health services have been handled as a privileged state duty for quite a long time. The commencement of this understanding may date back to the establishment of Ministry of Health in 1920. By the establishment of the ministry, health services became a principal state duty carried out by a separate ministry and the official health policy followed from those years to 1970s became a policy considering the fact that health services should be given by the public.

On the government level, from time to time, or secretly oppositions to this policy and attempts of preventing this policy were occurred but the policy was not changed openly and an active privatization program was not applied. As a natural result of this, public influence for the services was increased.

A great transformation in health sector began to be experienced within the efforts of practicing the enlargement which is free to the abroad by the effect of the wave of globalization after 1980 in Turkey. These policies perceived insistently not only in the field of health sector, but also in all sectors became official and written government policies by the decisions <sup>1</sup> of 24 January 1980. In addition to this, the policy handling health and social security services within the rules of supply and demand of the market and considering them as services benefited by people in compliance with their social opportunities.

In addition to this, the policy has become an official policy handling health and social security services in compliance with rules of supply and demand of the market and considering them as services by which people benefit in accordance with their social opportunities. Therefore, a period which can be called as "Active Privatization Period" began for the health services and Constitution of Turkish Republic was rearranged in this direction. The definition of "state depending on human rights" which is a statement of a social state and which is written in the Constitution of 1961 was changed by the Constitution of 1982 and was transformed as "state which is respectful to the human rights". In the same way, the articles stipulating health and social security services as a duty to the state were removed and new articles providing that these services shall be protected and drawn by the state were

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<sup>1</sup> In 24 January 1980, a program which passed into the economic literature with the name of "Decisions of 24 January" and which includes structural transformations became effective. With this program, instead of an introvert economic model that was closed to the outside world, a competitive economic model was established, measures to shrink the share of the state in economy was taken, foreign trade became free, foreign capital investments are encouraged, dollar exchange became free, control over the exchange market was released, interest rates became free of interference, the validity of rules of market was aimed by releasing the price controls and restrictions. It had been alleged that the basic goal of the policy that would have been followed was to reconstruct Turkish economy according to the conditions of ever changing world. T.R. Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, <http://www.foregntrade.gov.tr/Ekonomi/75yilbk/1980so.htm> (15.02.2006)

stipulated. Therefore, in accordance with the Constitution, health was begun to be perceived as a service not as a human right.

The basic feature of two decades in Turkey is that during this period of time there were efforts and forces for appropriating health sector, especially public health sector, to this new official policy. The solution at this point, generally, is providing “family medical service” depending on the basis of doctor’s office instead of village clinics for the presentation of the service (organization) and private insurance and paying individually [2] set up on the “general health insurance” for its financing.

In this framework, organization and financing of health services in Turkey has been determined as the basic study field. In this field, reforms realized in the transition period during which the understanding of health services given by the public was replaced by an understanding of "private" health services will be handled, evaluated and the health system in Turkey will be evaluated by mentioning about the effects of the reforms on the health system.

## **II. Presentation of Health Services in Turkey**

### **A. Organization of Health Services in Turkey**

A great number of official, semi official and private establishments work for the production of health services and for their financing and their number is nearly fifty [1]. Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense, Social Security Organization, Faculties of Medicine, Ministry of National Education, Mail Telephone Telegraph, Turkish Republic State Railways, Municipalities and State Economic Enterprises, are the main establishments providing health services. In addition to them, non-governmental organizations of the minorities and foundations, Red Crescent, The Organization of Fight Against Tuberculosis, as well as profit oriented private sector establishments provide health services. Hospitals affiliated with Social Security Organization, State Railways, Mail Telephone Telegraph and similar establishments were bound to the Ministry of Health by a law dated 2005<sup>2</sup>.

Although it has been claimed that the aim of this transfer is to provide health services by health organizations, it is striking that Ministries and organizations bound and related to them, TGNA (Turkish Grand National Assembly, Presidency of Turkish Republic, Turkish Armed Forces and University hospitals are excluded from this new arrangement [3]. Discussions and reactions from the community about the transfer of the hospitals bound to especially SSK continue.

When considering the fact that the organizations apart from the Ministry of Health provide generally and solely hospital service and give this service to certain groups, basic framework of health services in Turkey is formed by the organization of Ministry of Health. Besides, in compliance with the current laws, the organization which is responsible and authorized for the health of the country is the Ministry of Health. This ministry is an organization depended on central administration. There are ministry, undersecretary and five vice-undersecretaries on the central level. As well, the ministry is consisted of over twenty departments in which there are eight main service departments, eight assistant service departments and four related departments. The chief of the health services in the cities is the Governor. Local Health Authority is the authority who is the consultant of the governor and who maintains the service on behalf of the governor.

The flow of the services in the departments of Ministry of Health in Turkey is provided by the “system of conveyance”. The origin of this system began in 1960s. The revolution government of 1960 felt the necessity of giving importance and priority to the health services and this understanding was reflected to the Constitution which was re-arranged and health services became a fundamental and constitutional state duty by the articles of 48 and 49 of the Constitution of 1961. In order to re-arrange and organize health services, the Law on the Socialization of Health Services drawn up by the leadership of Dr. Nusret Fişek, undersecretary of Ministry of Health (and Social Aid) of that time was

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<sup>2</sup> Act numbered 5283 related to Conveying Health Units Belonging to Some Public Institutions and Organizations to the Ministry of Health, Official Gazette 19.01.2005, 5283.

entered into force in 5<sup>th</sup> January 1961. Therefore, in the history of health services of Turkey, a new period that can be called as “Socialization Period” began. In 1977, spreading out of socialized health services, of which practice began in 1963, to the whole country was targeted. In 1982, completion of the establishment of “a village clinic” for every 5000 people was envisaged. The act numbered 224 has turned out to be the act which expresses healthy life and medical care as a connate right, and execution policy of this basic right by the state most clearly and which puts it into writing by the law. Through this law, integration and distribution of health services by one institution was envisaged and aimed.

At the farthest end of the structure founded by this system exists the private asylum which is for a population of 2500-3000. In health houses, a midwife works and they are principally responsible for the health services for mother-children. Determining of the pregnant, their controls in regular intervals, their confinement, following of women recovering from childbirth and their children and their control and vaccination services are main duties expected to be realized by midwives. In addition to these, they are responsible for infectious diseases, family planning, nutrition and health training, environment health and similar other health problems of the population of their district.

Over the private asylum exists the village clinic. In rural areas, there is one village clinic for 5–10 thousand people, in urban areas there is one village clinic for 15–35 thousand people. In village clinics, there are doctor, health officer, nurse, midwife and assistant health staff numbers of whom are changed in accordance with the population. Village clinics, in addition to protective health services, are responsible for treatments at home and ambulatory treatments (first step) and they monitor, evaluate all events related to the health of its community and solve the problems which can be solved by their possibilities. For the problems which can not be solved by the village clinic, it demands aid from superior authorities.

Village clinics in Turkey are the first application and monitoring point of the health services. The problem of the people who are applied to the clinic is diagnosed, if it can not be solved by the conditions of the clinic or can not be diagnosed, the patient is transferred to the city or district hospitals (second step treatment organizations). From those city and province hospitals, patients are transferred to the third step treatment organizations which are equipped with advanced technology (education hospitals, university hospitals...vs.) because of the same reasons [4].

In addition to the village clinics and hospitals in Turkey, there are Mother-Child Health Centers, Dispensaries Fighting Tuberculosis, Hygiene Institutes and Public Health Laboratories providing high level assistance to the health services. Health Profession High schools, Region Warehouses and Repair Yards, Airport Sanitary Control Center, Border Sanitary Control Center, Coastal Sanitary Control Center are other units. As it is understood from these institutions, a huge structure in terms of both kind and number is in question.

However, in 1970s, health policy adopted by the law of socialization numbered 224 began to be in contradiction with the neo-liberal policy of the administration in power beginning from 1965. As a result of this, socialization program which was very convenient to the country's conditions could not have the necessary support from central governments and field of health became an argument/conflict milieu of two separate programs, therefore success of the program got impossible [5]. The result is practicing of “family medicine” system depending on the basis of doctor’s offices.

### **Family Medicine System in Turkey**

A structural transformation is envisaged in the first step health organizations in Turkey. This structural transformation depends on mainly “family medicine system”. Family medicine is proposed by the World Bank to Turkey as an alternative for the organization of the first step health services. In accordance with 2004 report of Turkey given by the World Bank, family medicine is the most important achievement of the privatization of the first step health services in Turkey. Therefore, the credit of 49.4 million Euro was given to Turkey<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> 49,4 million Euros was provided from the World Bank as a result of the Credit Agreement signed in 11 June 2004 between the T.R. and the Bank for the Support Project of “The Transformation Program In Health”. The credit in question forms the first piece of a 200

Practicing of family medicine in Turkey has changed the collective structure of protective health services provided collectively to the person and the environment and carried out by a team consisted of many disciplines and it separates protective health service oriented to the person and gives responsibility to the "family doctor" with the first step curative medicine services. Therefore, individuals having the right of "freedom of choosing their doctors" may have the health service from the family doctor whom they "wished" in certain conditions. It has been stated that for the practicing of family medicine system, available village clinics' infrastructure will be used in rural areas, besides especially in cities practicing independent medicine and private polyclinic will be carried out [6].

A document was published by the Ministry of Health in 2004 about family medicine and legal arrangements were drawn up. By these arrangements, realization of "family medicine experimental practice" was envisaged in the cities to be determined and afterwards spreading out of this system in Turkey was projected. For "family medicine experimental practice" of which limits were determined by laws and regulations, health staff like family medicine specialist or expert doctor or doctors having the necessary training envisaged by the Ministry of Health, "family doctor", nurse doing her job with the family doctor, midwife, health officer who work fulltime in a given place and provide mobile health service have been designated as "family health personnel".

This team consisting of family doctor and family health personnel will provide health services under certain conditions to the people whose responsibilities belong to them (number 1000-4000). Individuals will be bound to a doctor in their village clinic in the first six months of the experimental practice and at the end of this period of six months they will choose the doctor whomever they want within the boundaries of their district.

The law binding being family doctor or family health personnel firstly to the volunteering, if there is no sufficient volunteers, binding it to the employing give the opportunity of employing doctors and family health personnel who work freely and are not public officers if there is a necessity of them. Therefore, the statute and payment of the personnel to be employed within the experimental practice has a different structure. Another important side of the experimental practice of family medicine is that the service to be provided is free of charge. However, this is a practice comprising the period of experimental practice. Because, family medicine is a system to be financed by a general health insurance, this will be mentioned in the following parts. When family medicine and general health insurance system begin to be experienced completely in Turkey, family doctor will firstly control whether the patient pay his/her insurance premium or not and will provide the service in accordance with this.

In many cities chosen for the family medicine system, the experimental practice has begun. However, it is not suitable to call this practice as "experimental". Because if the results of experimental practice turns out to be negative, spreading out of the system should be renounced. Current government in Turkey has not such an idea. Realization of family medicine under the name of "experimental" practice is until the full practice of general health insurance law. After entering into force of general health insurance law, family medicine will not be anymore as "experimental" practice and it will spread out rapidly to the whole country and village clinics will be transformed to the "family medicine centers". After the closing of village clinics, "protective health services" which are the duties of the village clinics will begin to be provided by Community Health Centers. In compliance with the 4<sup>th</sup> article of the arrangement related to this subject Community Health Centers are health centers organizing health services of the people living in its region and the community, providing protective health services to the community, coordinating between the organizations providing the first step

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million Dollar package which comprises the years of 2004-2007. The main objective of the project was announced as improving the medical care services, forming the infrastructure of shifting to the application of general health insurance, reorganization of Ministry of Health, implementing the family medicine system and forming an integrated information technology in the fields of health and social security. The project is to be performed by both the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Social Security. The credit provided from the World Bank had 17 years of fixed term 4 of which would be without payment, the interest rate would be the sum of the variable margin that would be fixed in every six months by variable interest rate which was based on Euro Libor. The Press Announcement of T.R. Prime Ministry Treasury Undersecretary, 11 June 2004, Number: 2004/73, <http://www.hazine.gov.tr/duyuru/basin> 2004 (14.02.2007).

health service and other organizations, carrying out health training with administrative services and supervision activities. However, as to be mentioned below, the staffs working for these centers have great problems.

Experimental family medicine practice began in Düzce has given some clue in terms of the practice of the system in Turkey. This is why this system which has been planned to be found in here has to be evaluated.

### **Family Medicine Practice in “Experimental City” of Düzce**

Within the framework of the model experienced in Düzce, firstly laboratory, immunization and monitoring services given by Family Health Centers are provided free of charge, no contribution rate is demanded and all expenses met by the public budget of the Ministry of Health. However, the ground of this system depends on collecting premiums and payment of the service that is provided from this premium system within the scope of General Health Insurance. The fact that the experimented practices lack the fundamental elements of the model estranges the practices from being “experimental” and causes the evaluations to be obtained be lacking.

“Conveyance chain” which is one of the fundamental elements of the model was applied for quite long time (9 months) in Düzce. Problems began to arise because of the conveyance obligation. As an incorrect result of the policies, people who are used to having direct service from the second and third step went towards to family doctors because of the conveyance obligation from the first step and this increased patient applications and made family medicines impossible to visit the houses and give public trainings [7].

Beside, within the framework of the model applied in Düzce protective services given by the family medicines has lost their priority. Family medicines state that their polyclinic and registration works have increased compared to the past and spend most of their time for these. Besides, they provide periodical monitoring of the risk groups, protective services as family planning and immunization to only the people whom are applied to them [8]. For example, in case the family doctor faces with an infectious disease, their responsibility is limited with only "giving notice". Monitoring and evaluating of these notices by Community Health Centers and the necessary treatment are expected to be given by these centers. At the beginning of the practice, the population distributed to the family doctors was consisted of the regions bound to the village clinics. However, “the practice of choosing family doctor” will make the situation more dangerous. With this practice, family doctors may loose the population from different regions and the determination of the regional features of infectious disease notices will be difficult. This situation lack of a planned practice towards protective services and prevention of infectious diseases is worrying.

Within the Düzce model, health personnel who did not join among the staff of family doctors or family health personnel were assigned to the Community Health Centers with a salary less than that of their colleagues have. Health personnel working for Community Health Center think that the personnel who do not want to work for the model of family medicine is sacrificed and they perceive their department as punishment places in which they work with low salaries [8]. This practice which endangers working peace seriously leads Community Health Center personnel to provide service with family doctors and so sentence the Düzce model to failure at the beginning. However, carrying out of protective services in Düzce was renounced and this service was made limited with the people who were applied and those who came when they were called [8].

The Ministry of Health has began the practice of family medicine in other cities without bothering to explain why Düzce was elected as the experimental practice city, what kind of contributions did the experimental practice in Düzce provided to health medium, what kind of changes it did in first step health services and health indications. The fact that the family medicine is tried to be spread out without evaluating its results is worrying for the sake of the health system in Turkey.

## B. Funding Of Health Services In Turkey

One of the main elements that determine the organization of health services is funding. There are mainly four methods in the funding of health services [1]:

1. **Funding With Public General Budget Source:** In this method, the money to be used in health services are collected from citizens as general taxes and all the expenditures of health services are paid from public budget. There is no direct money relation with the health service buyers and providers.
2. **Funding With Compulsory Social Security Source:** In this method, individuals make a monthly and an advance payment (premium) and a particular insurance fund is created. Afterwards, the health expenditures of individuals are paid from this fund. There is no direct money relation with the health service buyers and providers.
3. **Private Insurance and Close Network System:** In this method, individuals make an advanced payment (premium) following a particular payment schedule by signing a contract with a private insurance company. Afterwards, when they need to health service, the expenditures of services that are written in the security package (the list of services to be paid for) are paid by this insurance. The only difference of close network system from insurance is that the insurance company is most commonly founded by the doctors and that it provides health service on its own. Service is provided by the company to the ones who paid in advance. If there are services that take place in the security package but that the company does not produce, these kinds of services are taken from other health institutions. There is a direct money relation with the service provider and buyer in this type of private privatization.
4. **Paying Expenditure (Charge) During Service:** In this method, the service buyer pays the charge of the service individually at that moment; that is he buys it. There is a direct money relation between the service provider and the service buyer.

General budget sourced funding method among the four methods mentioned above may be used solely and purely. The others' solely usage is not in question because there are some services in the health sector that are not priced or that are not individual and benefited by the whole society. The payment of these expenses from the public budget is compulsory. For this reason, the societies that do not pay all their health expenditures from the public budget, at least two or more funding method is used altogether.

All the finance methods except close network system are being used in Turkey. While the expenditures of Ministry of Health, direct state payments and university hospital expenditures are being paid from the general budget, the expenditures of SSO, Social Security Organization for Artisans and the Self-Employed and Pension Fund will be in the scope of compulsory insurance. While the health system is financed by the premium system for the ones that are within the scope of SSO and Social Security Organization for Artisans and the Self-Employed, the system is financed by the taxes for civil servants and the retired. With its current structure, the population within the scope of SSO is 23 millions, the population within the scope of Social Security Organization for Artisans and the Self-Employed is 9 million, the population within the scope of Pension Fund is 10 million, and the population that is not included in the health insurance is 14 million people [9]. Moreover, expenditure payment before service is common. Private insurance, in recent years, has seen a big encouragement and has developed, approximately one and a half million people are currently member of these kind of insurances. As there is no close network system available in Turkey, the laws are suitable for these laws and it is possible for it to be effective soon.

### General Health Insurance Law In Turkey

The Social Securities and General Health Insurance Law, which is one of the four steps of the "Social Security Reform" that is aimed to be realized under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, was opened to public opinion in 2003 to take opinions of the parties and to let public discuss the law. From that day, this proposal that has found the opportunity of being discussed by public was

adapted in 19 April 2006 by The Grand National Assembly of Turkey despite the oppositions of non-governmental organizations and main opposition party. Some articles of this act numbered 5510 were repealed by The Supreme Court and its effectivity was postponed until 1 July 2007. With the application of the law, the funding system in the field of health will completely change. The general health insurance which is known as “compulsory health insurance system that includes the whole society” is being justified by the reasons such as improving the service quality, offering equal basic health service to every patient and terminating the money relation between the doctor and patient. The question why these listed titles weren’t realized by a tax based funding is not answered in the document, and it was understood that such a concern did not exist at all. Basic and fundamental option in funding was determined as insurance. The fund that is going to be established by the premiums that are collected by the general health insurance system to be founded will constitute for the basis of the funding. The problems related to the funding in health system will be solved by the general health insurance premium system that are going to be collected from individuals and by the public supports.

With the new arrangement, all citizens are included in the general health insurance. Only the ones who are fulfilling their military service (their treatment expenditures are going to be paid from general budget), the foreign country citizens who have social insurance in their own countries, the imprisoned will be left out of the scope as exceptions. With the general health insurance, besides Turkish citizens, the ones who have been living in Turkey for more than one year, stateless people and refugees are also taken within the scope. General health insurance premium rate is determined as 12.5%. 5% of the premium will be paid by the employee, 7.5% of it will be paid by the employer. The premium of the poor will be paid by the state. According to *status quo*, health expenditures of public employees are paid by their institutions, therefore they don’t pay any health insurance to Pension Fund. 5% health premium is going to be conducted from the employees who are subject to Pension Fund. On the last applied date for treatment to benefit from the health services, the condition of paying the premium of 30 days is required. But in current system, the ones who are subject to the Pension Fund start benefiting from their right of medical care. Within the system of general health insurance, it is aimed to support private health insurances to “play a complementary role”. As it was pointed out in the Health Transformation Program, people may buy insurance in addition to basic security package that the general health insurance covers and they may have this service through private insurance. In this context, private insurance will be encouraged. Thus, it is understood that an important part of the health services needed won’t be paid by “basic security package” and that people should pay individually for the services excluded by this “package” or that they should prefer private health insurance.

The government of Justice and Development Party (AKP) alleges that the citizens currently can not benefit from the health services equally, and that they will benefit from the health services and health organizations equally thanks to general health insurance [10]. In the justification of the law instead of “a perception in which high income groups will finance low income groups and healthy ones will finance patients and so the risk is shared”, the equality that will be brought by the general health insurance is described as their paying the same premium and contribution rate for the treatment of their illnesses whatever their wages are. That is what the AKP understands from equality in health [11]. But equality in health is that everyone can achieve to health services when they need and that they can pay this as well as equality in benefiting from the same health service in the same proportion. Depending on the limited health assistance that the general health insurance will provide, a dual system will outstand. There will be discrimination between the health institutions for the ones who have the capacity of paying, who have complementary insurances and who can pay for health service, and the public health organizations that are settled for with the health assistance and partial payments of general health insurance. Thus, the inequalities in the health system of Turkey will outstand contrary to the expression. Moreover, the unemployed, the employed that are working in small companies of shadow economy, irregular income groups such as in the agriculture section etc., many people who are in a situation that they can not pay their premiums regularly will lack health assurance by being pushed

out of the general health insurance. The ones that can not pay the premium of the general health insurance and the ones that can not pay the contribution rate during the service procurement will confront with difficult situations as they can not benefit from health services. The fact that the ones who are so poor that their premiums are being paid by the state will also face these difficult situations as they also have to pay the contribution rate. This will force them to cut down their expenditures, for example their food expenditure, and so the poor will be poorer.

**Table 1:** Food Expenditure of A Four Membered Family In Turkey \*

	<b>February 2005</b>
Mature employee	95.50 dollars
Mature woman	80.22 dollars
15-19 age group	101.78 dollars
4-6 age group	71.30 dollars
Hunger level	348.81 dollars
Poverty level	1060 dollars

\* Dollar rate was accounted as 1.5 YTL

According to Table 1, “The “poverty level” is 1060 dollars, hunger level is 348 dollars for a four membered family according to the 2005 data when the needs such as food, rent, transportation, fuel, electricity, water, communication, clothing, health, culture.

**Table 2:** Staff Salaries \*

<b>Salary Bracket</b>	<b>Number of Staff</b>	<b>Rate (%)</b>
Below 333 dollars	11.200	1.21
Between 333-466 dollars	335.496	36.44
Between 466-600 dollars	379.971	41.27
Between 600-800 dollars	167.097	1.15
Between 800-1000 dollars	13.700	1.49
Between 1000-1333 dollars	6.352	0.69
Above 1333 dollars	6.918	0.75
<b>Total</b>	<b>920.754</b>	<b>100</b>

\*T.R. Ministry of Finance, prepared according to 2005.

As it is seen in the table 2, 98.56% of 920.754 employees earn less than 1060 dollars which is the determined to be the poverty level of a 4 membered family according to the data of Ministry of Finance. In this situation where unemployment has reached to higher degrees and where the poverty has reached to  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the society, deducting from the wages of employees for the sake of health services or demanding contribution rate doesn't seem rational.

### III. Conclusion

The health reforms which turn out to be a concept that take place in almost any countries' politic terminology has either started, proposed or are being discussed in every country [12]. Turkey is a country in which inequalities are highly common and therefore needs a reform in the matter of health. As a result, the reforms that are made or planned to be made in the field of health are always on the agenda. The Turkish health system that experienced the first reform wave by the act of “Socialization in Health Services” issued in 1961 witnessed the second wave of health reforms at the beginning of 1990's parallel to the attempts of reform in health that began with the effect of globalization and liberalization trends that was in question globally and then tried to implement the third wave health reforms that the party in power, AKP, exposed in 2003 with the name of “Transformation in Health”,

being the only government party after the 3 November 2002 elections. It was claimed that the second and the third waves were same in essence in means of content and strategy [13]. The first wave health reforms resulted with the application of the issued act; the second wave reform studies couldn't have completed the process of adoption as a law as a result of the economic and politic instability of the term, oppositions of non-governmental organizations, lack of support from society. The third wave reform process which is shaped by the European Union and one-party government is currently shifting in to the application phase after completing the phase of becoming law. Making the family medicine experimental practice and General Health Insurance become a law by The Grand National Assembly of Turkey heads the list.

But the reforms that are planned to be made will far more deepen the existing inequalities rather than solving the problems faced in health sector of Turkey. Nonetheless, for the reforms to be successful in a country, they should be adopted by her citizens. Especially health services are the services that society attaches importance to, just contrary to what politicians believe [14].

For this reason, social acceptance and espousal of the reforms, especially which are made in health, is important. As the current government does not have this kind of a concern, their success in implementing these basic amendments in health policy and in formulating the society accordingly is unknown. Because the intended plan, as mentioned at the beginning of the study, is to shift the health from the perception of “a social fact” to “an individual fact”, the healthy life and medical care from “a basic connate human right” and the sanitary service from “a social duty and responsibility” to “an individual responsibility” to fulfill the requirements of the medical care rights. While the first perception gives the duty and responsibility of medical care rights to society and to its organized capacity, the state, the other perception sees the sanitary service as an instrument of profit by just letting this right to the supply – demand law of the market. The reforms that had been made after 1980 were intended to leave the medical care sector to the supply – demand law of the market. Nevertheless, this transition will not be easy and quick in Turkey because the policy and perception which have been tried to be implemented since 1980 contradicts with the policy and the perception that has long been established in the percipience of health organizations and society from the foundation of the Republic until this day. This is the reason why the “transition” that is tried to be implemented by the health law reforms could not achieve support from a wide audience. For example, the General Health Insurance Law was adopted in spite of the averseness of non-governmental organizations and the main opposition party. The effectivity of the law was repealed until 01.07.2007 after some of its articles had been repealed by Supreme Court. Discussions over the law are still continuing. All the same, attitudes that are aiming to protect the “statist” perception and system that have been established in Turkey since the foundation of the Republic have been shown off and as a result of this, the medical care sector has turned out to be the field of discussion of these two parties. This conflict also causes a dual structure in the exercises of central government and other governmental organizations. In one hand, while effort is being put forth towards privatization on government level and almost coercions are being called upon, in the other hand, investments are continuing by the state [1].

**Table 3:** General Budget According to 2001-2005 Fiscal Years, Budget of Ministry of Health and its ratios (%) \*

Year	General Budget (dollar)	Budget of Ministry of Health (dollar)	The Ratio of Ministry of Health Compared to the General Budget (%)
2001	32 billion 146 million dollars	853 million dollars	2.66
2002	65 billion 220 million dollars	1 billion 570 million dollars	2.41
2003	97 billion 870 million dollars	2 billion 380 million dollars	2.43
2004	99 billion 905 million dollars	3 billion 192 million dollars	3.19
2005	102 billion 618 million dollars	3 billion 641 million dollars	3.55

<http://www.saglik.gov.tr>

As it is understood from the table 3, bigger shares are transferred to Ministry of Health from general budget year by year and the budget ratio of Ministry of Health is getting bigger. But the source transferred to medical care from public is still insufficient; the sources transferred are not being used efficiently<sup>4</sup>.

As a result, all the structures and applications of medical care sector are determined by the conflict of these two policies and a medium of chaos exists. As a natural result of this chaos, a chaos also exists in the fields of organization and funding. Within the framework of reforms that are made within organization, village clinics and family medicine system are being implemented together, and the chaos goes on by the repeal of effectivity of General Health Insurance in the field of funding. But it is obvious that the fundamental feature of the post 1980 has been passed by the efforts and coercions to turn the medical care sector, especially the public medical care organization suitable into the “health perception of market” that has been adopted. With this objection, the funding and organization of medical care services has been opened to discussion and the attempts of reform has become visible. In the basis of the health reforms in Turkey lies the objective of turning the field in which private sector may operate, not eliminating the inequalities in health issues. One had better evaluate the reforms within this framework.

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<sup>4</sup> The money spared for health in Turkey is generally far below the developed countries. While it is estimated that the medical care expenditure per person in our country is 150-250 dollars, it is approximately ten times more in OECD countries,

# **Bosnia's 'Jihad' and the Development of Al Qaida: Past, Present, and Future**

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## **Abstract**

This study examines Bosnia's 'Jihad' and the development of al Qaida in the past, present, and future. The beginnings of the al Qaida in Afghanistan during the war against the Soviets are examined in the context of the establishment of the group. Next, the relocation of al Qaida to Bosnia and its expansion and operations there is detailed. Finally, the implications for future operations as well as policy recommendations are presented.

**Keywords:** International security, international terrorism, al Qaida, Bosnia, counterterrorism.

## **Introduction**

While the role the war in Afghanistan played in the development of al Qaida has received widespread attention from the media, various governments, and academics, another war where numerous members of al Qaida honed their combat skills has received far less attention. After Afghanistan, the 1992 – 1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the next major 'jihad' or 'holy war' which captured the attention of the Muslim world and contributed to the development of al Qaida. The narrative of the Bosnian war as portrayed by the media and various intellectuals, and eventually advanced by numerous western governments, especially the United States, was a tale of good as represented by secular Bosnian Muslims seeking to preserve a multi-cultural secular state, versus evil Bosnian-Serbs (and to a lesser degree Bosnian Croats) seeking the eradication of an entire group of people; a new holocaust in Europe. The role of radical Islamists fighting on the side of the Bosnian Muslim government in Sarajevo was a facet to the story that remained under-reported until after the 11 September 2001 attacks upon the United States (here after referred to as 9/11).

During the investigations into 9/11, the fact that two of 19 of al Qaida's suicide squad members, as well as the master terrorist Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (here after referred to as KSM), were veterans of the Bosnian jihad was uncovered. This fact calls for a re-examination of the role of the Bosnian conflict in the development of al Qaida. This paper will examine the roots of al Qaida's participation in the Bosnian conflict, the effect upon the evolution of this terrorist movement (both for al Qaida and Bosnia), and the implications for the US-led efforts to combat Islamic terrorism worldwide.

## **Al Qaida: The Base (or Foundation)**

As noted in the introduction, al Qaida originated out of the war resulting from the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. al Qaida was born of the so-called Afghan Service's Bureau (MAK) or Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab which was founded in Peshawar, Pakistan, and its mission was to support the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan (Gunaratna, 4). MAK was administered by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and his young understudy Usama Bin Laden (Gunaratna, 5) and was the vanguard for Islamists worldwide to join and use the jihad in Afghanistan to build a movement which would reestablish the Caliphate (Kohmann, 6). According to Professor Marc Sageman, 'Many of the founders of the global Salafi Jihad came to Afghanistan in the 1980s from different countries and without prior connection to each other' (Sageman, 25). The war in Afghanistan joined Islamists from around the world in a common struggle and provided the opportunity not only to obtain practical experience, but also to network with fellow travelers. The success of the ragtag resistance against the mighty Red Army also served as 'proof' that God would favor the jihadist endeavors. As noted by Abdullah Azzam during a fundraising trip to the US, 'Oh brothers, after Afghanistan, nothing in the world is impossible for us anymore. There are superpowers or mini-powers – what matters is the willpower that springs from our religious beliefs' (Kohlmann, 8-9). Azzam did not live to see his 'foundation' for jihad progress beyond Afghanistan, as he was assassinated in 1989, most likely by members of the Egyptian wing of the movement that strongly disagreed with the direction Azzam wanted to take the movement post-Afghanistan (Kohlmann, 11). Al Qaida, the movement he started, was meant to be the base or foundation from which an Islamic insurgency that would reunite the Islamic world would be built.

## **End of the Jihad in Afghanistan: Now What?**

The end of the anti-Soviet phase of the conflict in Afghanistan and reluctance of the government of Pakistan to continue to host the jihadi elements posed a serious problem for the Islamist movements such as al Qaida. The situation devolved from a clear case of defensive jihad to an inter-Afghan conflict. Though many of the foreign Islamists considered it their religious duty to return to their home countries and establish Islamic states, many battle hardened veterans of the conflict in Afghanistan were not welcome in their home countries as they were subject to arrest, torture, death or expulsion, and unwilling to remain in Afghanistan (Gunaratna, 5; Kohlmann, 16). The Bosnian conflict was a timely development as it provided a place to ply their trade (Kohlmann, 16) and further spread their austere version of Islam (Tabib, 1994). The first commander of the 'Mujahedin' in Bosnia, Abu Adbel Aziz 'Barbaros,' described the development of the Bosnian crisis as a windfall: 'We were looking for Jihad (after Afghanistan). We found it in the Philippines, and in Kashmir. Only fifteen days lapsed (after the conquest of Kabul) and the crisis of Bosnia begun {sic}. This confirmed the sayings of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, who said, "Indeed Jihad will continue till the day of judgment." A New jihad started in Bosnia, (we moved there), and we are with it, if Allah wills' (Tabib, 1994). Bosnia therefore would become the next major jihad, and one that would mark the post-Azzam phase of al Qaida's development. As in Afghanistan, MAK and other Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would serve as the cover for members of the worldwide Islamic insurgency to move into the Balkans (Schindler, 120).

## **Bosnia's War Time Leadership: Islamists in Democrat's Clothing**

The participation of the radical Islamists, many of whom came from the global Islamist insurgent movement al Qaida, in the Bosnian war is one that received scant coverage in the western media during the war. The western media became fixated on the image of Bosnia's Muslim leaders as democrats, seeking to preserve a multi-ethnic republic based upon democratic principles (Schindler, 18). But was this perception in fact a reality? The answer to that question is found in an examination of the leaders

who led Bosnia into civil war; principle among them Alija Izetbegovic and his Party for Democratic Action (Stranka za Demokratsku Akciju or SDA).

Alija Izetbegovic, born in 1925, was a member of the 'Young Muslims' movement (Mladi Muslimani) in his youth (Schindler, 36). The Mladi Muslimani is known to have collaborated with the Nazis during World War II, and many of its members made up Himmler's Muslim SS Division 'Handschar' (Schlinder, 35-36). Victory for the Allies and the Communist 'Partisan' forces of Jozep Broz Tito in World War II led to the development of Yugoslavia. According to Professor John R. Schindler of the US Naval War College, 'Under communism, Islam in general was considered especially retrograde' (Schlinder, 37); thus it comes as no surprise that Alija Izetbegovic and his fellow Islamists in the Young Muslims found themselves on the defensive and oppressed. In spite of the repression, Izetbegovic assisted the Young Muslims to produce their 'El-Mudžahid (The Holy Warrior) resulting in his imprisonment for membership in the Young Muslims in the late 1940s (Schlinder, 37). In spite of a routing of the Young Muslims movement between 1946 and 1949, the movement reconstituted itself, and Izetbegovic rejoined the movement upon his release from prison (Schlinder, 40). The movement maintained ties with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and continued to exist just outside of the scope of the Yugoslavian security police until the 1980s when the secret police learned of Izetbegovic's 'Islamic Declaration' and the movement's ties to Iran (Schlinder, 40-45). Izetbegovic's Islamic declaration gives us insight into the mind of the man who would become the President of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, 'There can be no peace or harmony between the 'Islamic religion' and non-Islamic social and political institutions' (Schlinder, 45). Izetbegovic's declaration called for the Islamization of the Muslims (Schlinder, 45). During his trial for authoring the Islamist manifesto, he further clarified his ideology by stating 'Islamic society without an Islamic government is incomplete and impotent' (Schlinder, 46). Such was the view Izetbegovic had of the world and the potential of his ideal Islamic society to live under non-Islamic government. The party Izetbegovic founded in 1989 was meant to represent the interests of the Bosnian Muslims (Schlinder, 47). When war came to Bosnia, the 'secular and democratic nature' of the SDA was clearly revealed by the SDA party boss of Tuzla in his pro-SDA newspaper in the North-Eastern town of Tuzla which clearly stated the SDA's goals (Schlinder, 96):

The territory controlled by the Bosnian Army after the war will be a Muslim state. This is the desire of the Muslim people and, after all, our secular leader Alija Izetbegovic and our religious leader Mustafa Cerić (the latter in a private conversation with me) confirmed that the old dream of Alija Izetbegovic, a member of the Young Muslims, has been and remains the establishment of a Muslim state in Bosnia-Herzegovina; finally, his dream is close to realization and 'he is not terribly upset about it' (Schlinder, 96).

The Muslim state will be the national state of Bosniaks, or Muslims (with civil rights for minorities). All citizens will be guaranteed equality before the law, while the level of personal prosperity, besides individual initiative, will especially depend on the degree to which the individual accepts and applies the principles and spirit of Islamic ideology. The Muslim state will have an Islamic ideology based upon Islam, Islamic religious, legal, ethical, and social principles. No state has ever assisted its opposition, nor has it deliberately offered the possibility for the promotion of opposing ideals and political interests. People who prove to be true Muslims, aware nationalists, and good believers will naturally have higher social privileges than those who persist in their opposition (Schlinder, 96).

Islam will be imposed, per Koranic teaching, but the spirit of the ideology will be systematically promoted and will infuse the society in all possible ways--non-Muslim material will be on the margins of production and broadcasting. The Islamic ideology will aim to gradually abolish the duality between the sacred and secular, religious and political, which has been imposed on us by secularized Christian Europe against our will. In its nature, Islam does not recognize the difference between religious and social. After

all Islam is not a 'religion' a religious-political ideology, and all-encompassing approach to living...true Islam always aims to encompass the society in which it exists, and with it its political and state structures. Developing the virtuous Muslim state will take decades, under a dictatorship of the virtuous and wise, and democratization of the state can only occur after that (Schlinder, 96).

This ideology drove Izetbegovic and his SDA before, during, and after the war. Far from being a democrat seeking to preserve a multi-ethnic state, Izetbegovic and his SDA sought to establish an Islamic state within Europe. Thus, it is understandable why members of the Mujahedin who traveled to Bosnia had great respect for Izetbegovic. The Mujahedin composed a poem during the war in which they lionized Izetbegovic 'O' Alija {Izetbegovic}, O' honored! You drive America crazy!' (Kohlmann, 217) This demonstrates the motivation for Izetbegovic and his allies to not only seek Mujahedin to participate in the Bosnian civil war, but to continue to provide safe haven to them after the hostilities ceased. One of the goals of the Mujahedin, as stated by their first commander Abu Abdel Aziz, was to 'strengthen our belief and the belief of our brethren the Bosnians by all means: Through training, through education, through awareness programs and other means' (Tabib, 1994). This matched nicely with Izetbegovic's/SDA's goal of 'systematically promoting (Islam) and to infuse it into the society in all possible ways' (Schlinder, 96). Between the horrors suffered by the population during the war, and the concerted efforts to re-vitalize the Islamic identity within Bosnian society, Izetbegovic, the SDA, and the foreign element were largely successful in linking religion and ethnicity. As noted by Captain Velko Atanasoff of the Naval Post-Graduate School, 'The sole establishment and survival of the country was based on the reification and resurrection of the Islamic identity which was tied irreversibly with the Bošniak nation.'

## **The Mujahedin in War**

Usama Bin Laden's interest in Bosnia was far from an altruistic desire to assist an oppressed Muslim population suffering from the genocidal designs of a 'crusading' army. As testified to by former al Qaida operative Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl, Aziz, who was one of al Qaida's key personnel in Bosnia (Kohlmann, 18-19), Aziz informed Fadl that Bin Laden was seeking to use Bosnia as a forward operating base from which to strike at the United States (Kohlmann, 19). In order to build their forward operating base, the mujahedin would have to be made up of veterans of Afghanistan (Kohlmann, 19). As noted above, many of these individuals were in need of a place to relocate after the Afghan jihad. Senior Al-Gamma at Islamiyya (IG) member Anwar Shaaban (another Afghan veteran who could not return to his home country) eventually obtained safe haven in Italy. It is from his safe haven in Milan that Shaaban assisted the flow of mujahedin from his Islamic Cultural Institute, and eventually assumed overall control of the mujahedin in Bosnia (Kohlmann, 19-22).

The first year of mujahedin participation (1992) was marked by examples of incredible tactical incompetence coupled with fanatical bravery under fire. The initial engagements in which the mujahedin were employed by their Bosnian hosts resulted in high casualty rates (Kohlmann, 66). Among those killed in these first engagements was Abu Zubair al-Madani, the cousin of Usama Bin Laden (Kohlmann, 58 – 60). Among those seriously injured in these first engagements was the infamous Abu Sulaiman al-Makki (Kohlmann, 29). Al-Makki was a veteran of Afghanistan who, after being paralyzed during the Bosnian war, remained in Bosnia to help establish an Islamic extremist village and Islamic NGOs meant to propagate radical Islam (Kohlmann, 2004). By 1997 he was wanted by the Bosnian government for involvement in terrorism (Kohlmann, 2004). According to terrorism expert Evan Kohlmann, al-Makki's next appearance after vanishing from Bosnia in 1997 was his 2001 appearance in a video, in which he appeared with Bin Laden and congratulated him on the 9/11 attacks (Kohlmann, 2004). In both of these cases, these fighters and those who served with them reportedly fought valiantly; however, the mujahedin and their Bosnian allies made numerous tactical errors which ultimately cost them dearly in terms of injured and dead (Kohlmann, 55-57). Beyond their

fervent desire to obtain martyrdom potentially overriding their tactical decision-making process, the mujahedin were reliant upon the larger regular forces of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) (Kohlmann, 57-62). In contrast to the mujahedin fervor in combat, the Bosnian government's ABiH would retreat when faced with the overwhelming superior firepower of the Bosnian-Serbs (Kohlmann, 56-64). Unlike Afghanistan, an additional factor, which may have initially led to high casualty rates among the mujahedin, was that the Bosnians were more than willing to allow their 'guests' to participate in combat. Bin Laden's cousin al-Madani noted, 'We were there in Afghanistan, but our participation was not real serious action like here now because the Afghans took us to be guests. So they did not want us to be too exposed or for us to die there' (Kohlmann, 58). In spite of their inability to achieve the military objectives in the operations in which they participated, the mujahedin gained the respect of members of the ABiH (Kohlmann, 66). In the words of one Bosnian 'They have no fear for their lives...they came here to die' (Schindler, 120). Additionally, while their military exploits were hardly successful, they were able to garner additional support from the Islamic world, once news of their exploits became known (Kohlmann, 66).

The second and third years of mujahedin activity in Bosnia were marked by an improvement in their overall utility to the Bosnian army; especially when conducting 'asymmetric warfare.' The 1993 – 1994 war between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnia Croats marked a turning point for the Bosnian mujahedin in that they were no longer able to rely upon their supply routes from Croatia into Bosnia, and their leadership was targeted by Croatian armed forces. The capture of several leading mujahedin personalities by Bosnian Croat forces in the winter of 1992 provided the necessary catalyst for a young Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) member, Abu Ma'ali, to take control of mujahedin in Zenica (Central Bosnia) and begin operations befitting battle-hardened terrorist operatives (Kohlmann, 80). For example, the mujahedin began kidnapping suspected Croatian intelligence officers, staging daring urban combat operations and ambushes, and abducting soldiers, including the April 1993 kidnapping of a Bosnian Croat general stationed in Zenica (Kohlmann, 82). The kidnapping of the Bosnian Croat general ultimately led to a prisoner exchange, during which all the captured mujahedin were released (Kohlmann, 82-84). This successful kidnapping operation gave the mujahedin a public relations victory, but ultimately may have contributed to the Bosnian Croats' decision to wage open war upon all Muslim forces (Kohlmann, 84).

Unlike the early campaigns, the mujahedin and their Bosnian allies were successful in their attacks against numerous Croat villages in the central Bosnia area. Beyond displaying battlefield proficiency, the mujahedin also displayed a special talent for cruelty and the commission of war crimes against both prisoners of war (POWs) and non-combatants (Kohlmann, 84-95). Tactics which would later come to mesmerize and horrify much of the civilized world during the war in Iraq (2003 – present) and Afghanistan (2001 – present), such as the video taping of ritual beheadings, occurred on several occasions during this phase of the Bosnia war. The United Nations' International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) would issue indictments against senior Bosnian Muslim leadership figures as a result of the crimes of the mujahedin (Schindler, 311). As of November 2007, General Rasim Delic, Bosnia's highest-ranking wartime commander, was on trial at The Hague for the crimes committed by the mujahedin.

During the final year of the war the mujahedin units were successfully used in integrated attacks involving regular Bosnian Muslim forces and mujahedin units against strategic Serb positions between May and September of 1995 (Kohlmann, 125). Three operations code-named 'Miracle,' 'Badr,' and 'Black Lion' utilized the mujahedin successfully against targets which had frustrated the ABiH's regular forces for years (Kohlmann, 137). These victories also saw the widespread commission of additional war crimes including the deliberate starving of POWs, forcing POWs to kill one-another for entertainment purposes, the use of torture in interrogation, and decapitation of POWs (Kohlmann, 130-137).

When the war was drawing to an end, it became clear to many nations that the mujahedin presented a risk to any deployed peacekeeping forces. On 22 September 1995, the Bosnian-based

mujahedin carried out a suicide bombing of a Croatian police station in the port city of Rijeka, Croatia (Kohlmann, 154). This operation was carried out in retaliation for the Croatian support of a 'rendition' of an IG terrorist to Egyptian custody (Kohlmann, 152-153). In the late September through October 1995 the Bosnian mujahedin targeted UN peacekeepers for harassment and detention (Kohlmann, 157). The danger to NATO peace keeping forces was the basis for a provision added to the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) which specifically called for the removal of all foreign fighters (not of local origin) from Bosnia within 30 days of the signing of the peace accords (Kohlmann, 160).

### **Residual Mujahedin**

To get around the provision of the DPA which called for the removal of all fighters not of local origin (Kohlmann, 163), Izetbegovic's government gave the mujahedin citizenship (Kohlmann, 163). These citizenships were granted either by virtue of their service in the Bosnian armed forces, marriage, or their roles as humanitarian aid workers (Schindler, 239). In spite of the DPA clearly authorizing the peacekeeping forces to remove fighters not of local origin, the failure of the International Community to hold the Bosnians accountable, coupled with Izetbegovic's/SDA's Islamist nature, prevented this condition from being fulfilled. In March 1996 in a letter to two US Senators concerned about the continued presence of mujahedin, Izetbegovic stated, 'It is incompatible with the moral principles of our people to expel the people who fought on our side and have no place to go because they cannot return to their countries' (Kohlmann, 175). Far from being an isolated comment by a President unsure that the recently signed peace accords would hold, in November 1997 Izetbegovic publicly stated 'nobody is going to throw you out!' to the passing members of a unit of mujahedin conducting pass and review (Schindler, 254). Ultimately hundreds of mujahedin remained in Bosnia in violation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Many of these individuals who remained in Bosnia began operating as 'humanitarian aid workers' – as many of them had been employed by Islamic NGOs during the war – and refocused their energies to 'da wa' or inviting the Bosnian Muslims to 'true Islam.' Additionally, these NGOs would continue the support to al Qaida and the global Islamic insurgency.

### **Bosnia-based NGOs and al Qaida**

Part of the reason behind the success of al Qaida has been their successful co-opting of Islamic NGOs (usually charities) in order to raise the funding necessary for their operations as well as frustrate the efforts of governments to monitor its financial activities (Comras, 2005). As with the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, Islamic NGOs played a major role in the successful infiltration of mujahedin members into Bosnia, and have supported operations beyond simply the Bosnian jihad (Kohlmann, 34). Additionally, Islamic NGOs have contributed to the overall success of al Qaida's establishment of a forward operating base within Bosnia, and helped to advance the Islamification of Bosnian society.

Islamic charities (some funded by governments, others privately funded) were able to act as a conduit for arms, fighters, funds, documents and logistical support to members of the mujahedin in Bosnia (Kohlmann, 35 – 49). Among the NGOs known to have had direct ties to al Qaida's central leadership – to include Bin Laden – was the Benevolence International Foundation or BIF (Kohlmann, 37). Shortly after 9/11, NATO forces and Bosnian forces raided the Bosnian offices of this NGO – which had long been the subject of an FBI investigation – and recovered documents that directly linked BIF to Bin Laden (Roth, Greenburg, Wille, 2004) and firmly established BIF's director, Ennam Arnout as a close associate of Bin Laden (Schindler, 288). In fact, the 1992 meeting of key al Qaida emissaries in which operative-turned-government informant al-Fadl attended was held at Arnout's BIF offices in Zagreb (Kohlmann, 18-19). According to al-Fadl, the meeting of al Qaida's Balkan emissaries – of which Arnout was one – specifically discussed building relations with banks and using relief organizations and the establishment of businesses in order to fund al Qaida's operations (Kohlmann, 19). In another example of Arnout's personal involvement in al Qaida activity, he 'personally arranged

for the importation of nine instructors from al Qaida's Al-Sadda camp in Afghanistan into central Bosnia' (Kohlmann, 19). The evidence netted in the Bosnian war was overwhelming (Johnson and Willing, 2001). Arnout ultimately pled guilty to lesser charges – which ironically included diversion of funds in order to supply military equipment to Bosnian fighters – in exchange for the US government dropping charges of aiding Bin Laden (Kohlmann, 225). During the sentencing phase of Arnout's case, the prosecutor noted:

As defendant now acknowledges, defendant became well-acquainted with Usama Bin Laden and al Qaida in the 1980s, having spent significant time in bin Laden's al Masada camp in Afghanistan and then living in Bin Laden's house. In 1997, defendant arranged to preserve in electronic form historical documents concerning Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda, as well as other persons and groups. These items, which have been discussed in detail in the government's Santiago Proffer and other filings, include the August 1988 minutes of the founding of al Qaeda and handwritten notes taken by defendant himself in October 1988 of a shura ('consultation') council meeting at Bin Laden's house involving Bin Laden and others that occurred two months after al Qaeda had been formed. In or about 1993, Bin Laden advised al Qaeda member Jamal Ahmed al Fadl that al Qaeda was using several charities to fund its operations overseas, specifically naming al Birr, which translates in English to *Benevolence*. Al Fadl understood from conversations with Bin Laden and others in al Qaeda that the charities would receive funds that could be withdrawn in cash and a portion of the money used for legitimate relief purposes and another portion diverted for al Qaeda operations. The charities also provided assistance for mujahedin who traveled (Epstein, 17-18).

Arnout was sentenced to 11 years in prison (Schindler, 161) for wire fraud and defrauding the donors who contributed to his organization (Kohlmann, 225). In 2005, Arnout's sentence was reduced to ten years as the US 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeals assessed there was no proof that Arnout deceived donors into funding Islamic fighters (Chicago Tribune, 2006).

While the example of Arnout's BIF may have been the most blatant, it was hardly the only NGO used to support al Qaida and the other terrorists who made up the mujahedin in Bosnia. As of November 2007, seven Bosnia-based NGOs have been designated either under US Executive Order 13224 or UN Security Council Resolution 1267 for support to al Qaida: Al-Haramain, Al-Haramain Al-Masid Al-Aqsa, Al-Furqan, Taibah, Benevolence International Foundation, Global Relief Foundation, and Vezir. While the number of designated NGOs is the highest number of designated terrorist support organizations in all of Europe, it does not include all known or strongly suspected al Qaida affiliated NGOs formerly or presently based in Bosnia. Nor has designation automatically resulted in the closure of an organization.

## **Active Islamic Youth**

Among the most enduring legacies of the mujahedin's participation in the Bosnia war was the formation of the Active Islamic Youth (Aktivna Islamska Omladina or AIO). The AIO was formed primarily out of the Bosnian veterans of the 'El-Mujahedin' unit (Latin, 2003; US State Department, 2006). The organization was founded in 1995 in Zenica, with the purpose of turning Bosnia into an Islamic state (US State Department, 2006) along the line of Afghanistan under the Taliban (Dani magazine, 1998). The reported leader of this organization, Adnan Pezo, a veteran of the el-mujahedin unit summarized this group's views on the potential for co-existing in a multi-ethnic, pluralistic society when he stated, 'There is no coexistence with the Catholics or the Orthodox, or Muslim atheists for that matter' (Schindler, 257).

Far from limiting their activities simply to proselytizing radical Islam, the AIO is known to have provided assistance to holy warriors traveling to Chechnya (Schindler, 267). Two Bosnians, Almir Zulum and Almir Tahirovic, are known to have been killed during insurgent operations in

Chechnya since the end of the Bosnia war (Dani, 2005; Caravan of Martyrs, 2007). AIO members have been linked to incidents which could have inflamed ethnic tensions such as the December 2002 murder of an entire family of Bosnian Croats in south-central Bosnian town of Kostajnica (Schindler, 291). AIO has carried propaganda in their bi-weekly magazine 'Saff' in which they have detailed the participation of Bosnians in the anti-US insurgency in Iraq (Schindler, 305). German intelligence has also reportedly linked AIO with the facilitation of Bosnians and other fighters headed to Iraq and Chechnya (Schindler, 305). As recently as 2006, Nihad Cosic, a Bosnian living in Germany, and known affiliate of the AIO was arrested in Pakistan for his links with al Qaida (Stark, Kleinhubbert, and Gebauer, 2007; Stark, Musharbash, Kasier, and Gebauer, 2007; Radio Free Europe, 2006).

### **'Bosnians' Influence upon Operations**

While hundreds of mujahedin remained in Bosnia, others went on to fight in other conflict zones such as Chechnya (Kohlmann, 167; Schindler, 256), and hundreds took advantage of the west's desire to expel the mujahedin. As noted by Izetbegovic – and as was the case when the Afghan jihad came to a close – many of these fighters could not go back to their home countries without facing torture or even death; thus these battle hardened 'Bosnian' operatives were able to leverage this fact to obtain asylum in the very Western world they sought to destroy:

As noted by French counter-terrorism magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere, 'The ex-filtration of significant numbers of veteran fighters from Bosnia was beneficial for al Qaida in the sense that it enabled the mujahedin 'to be useful again in spreading the jihad across other lands' (Kohlmann, 167).

These experienced 'Bosnian' operatives, would go forth and play vital roles in several terrorist plots, including the 'Millennium Plot,' and '9/11.'

As recounted by terrorist expert Professor Marc Sageman in his description of the 'Millennium Plot' to bomb Los Angeles International Airport, the key operatives in this plot were Bosnian jihadist veterans Mustapha Kamel, and Said Atmani (Sageman, 101). Atmani was deported from Canada to Bosnia in 1998, and then deported to France where he was imprisoned in connection to the GIA linked terrorist bombings of Paris in 1996 (Sageman, 102). Kamel, likewise, was imprisoned in France for his involvement in the GIA terrorist campaign (Sageman, 102). While these two jihadist leaders were not able to see the 'Millennium Plot' through to fruition, those they indoctrinated into radical Islam attempted to carry out the attack, and only failed because of an alert US Border Patrol Agent on the Canadian border (Sageman, 103).

9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (KSM) is among those who had moved from the Jihad in Afghanistan, to the battlefields of Bosnia (9/11 Commission, 146-147; Schindler, 260). According to the 9/11 Commission, 'In 1992 KSM spent some time fighting alongside the mujahedin in Bosnia and supporting that effort with financial donations' (9/11 Commission, 147). KSM is also known to have traveled to Bosnia between 1993 -1996 in what the 9/11 commission viewed as 'related to his abiding interest in carrying out terrorist operations' (9/11 Commission, 488). The 9/11 Commission also noted an interrogation report which established 'KSM's presence in Bosnia coincided with a police station bombing in Zagreb<sup>1</sup> where the timing device of the bomb (a modified Casio watch) resembled those manufactured by KSM and Yousef (Rasmi Yousef) in the Philippines for the Manila air operation.' Additional Bosnia veterans who directly participated in 9/11 included Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, two of the 19 al Qaida suicide operatives (Schindler, 281). The 9/11 committee noted their service in the Bosnian jihad:

Hazmi and Mihdhar were Saudi Nationals, born in Mecca. Like the others in the initial group of selectees, they were already experienced mujahedin. They had traveled together

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<sup>1</sup> This is likely a reference to the 1995 suicide bombing of a police station in Rijeka, Croatia, staged from Bosnia referenced above.

to fight in Bosnia in a group that journeyed to the Balkans in 1995 (9/11 Commission, 155).

Among the other notable 9/11 conspirators with Bosnian service in their resume was Mohammed Haydar Zammar (Schindler, 281; Finn, 2002), who reportedly assisted 9/11 ‘field commander’ Mohammed Atta in planning the attack (Schindler, 281) and, at the very least, ‘persuaded Atta and other 9/11 members to act upon their extremist ideology’ (9/11 Commission, 164).

Additionally, there are many reports that both Ayman al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden himself traveled to Bosnia on several occasions (Flottau, 2007; Gossett, 2005). There are reports that Bin Laden had not only traveled to the area, but had also obtained a Bosnian passport (Schindler, 282; Shay, 141). While the truth of such reports may have been the result of faulty recollections or sensationalist reporting, it is worth noting that Bin Laden was not the international pariah he became after 1998, and was a respected financier of Islamist causes – such as Izetbegovic’s desire to establish a Muslim state in Europe and the unification of all Muslim lands in a single state (Shay, 44). It is highly plausible that Bin Laden traveled to Bosnia at some point during the war. Thus, as noted by highly respected Bosnian journalist, Senad Avdic, ‘If bin Laden doesn’t have a Bosnian passport, then he has only himself to blame’ (Schindler, 282). In 2005 the Bosnian government adopted a law establishing a commission to review all citizenships granted to foreigners from 1992 – 2005 (US Department of State, 2005 and 2006). The Citizenship Review Committee (CRC) is seen as a valid attempt by the government of Sarajevo to live up to its obligations under the Dayton Peace Accords as well as bolster its chances to ease visa restrictions upon its citizens seeking travel to Europe. As of 2007, no residual mujahedin had been deported from Bosnia.

Veterans of the Bosnian jihad would go on to play important leadership roles in al Qaida cells in Saudi Arabia. The attack against western facilities in Khobar largely credited with shocking the government of Saudi Arabia out of its complacency was lead by Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, a veteran of the Bosnian jihad (Schindler, 303-304). In 2005 the Bosnian government admitted that the most wanted terrorist in Saudi Arabia, Yunis Mohammed Ibrahim al-Hayari –leader of al Qaida in Saudi Arabia until his death while resisting arrest by Saudi security forces in late 2005,– was in fact a Bosnian citizen (Schindler, 304). The importance of ‘Bosnians’ assuming leadership roles in one of its most important operational theaters in al Qaida’s worldwide Islamic insurgency cannot be discounted. As the home for Islam’s two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina, al Qaida would naturally only appoint proven operators to function in such an important and challenging location. These operations would demonstrate implications for the future of al Qaida as an organization, and for the global Islamic insurgency of which they are one of the ‘centers of gravity.’

## **Implication for Future Operations**

Many of the factors that went into making Bosnia-Herzegovina an attractive staging point for al Qaida and its fellow travelers in the global Islamic insurgency remain present today. As noted in the US State Department’s 2006 report on Bosnia:

Bosnia and Herzegovina's law enforcement organizations cooperated with the United States on international counter-terrorism. Bosnia remained a weak state, however, with multiple semi-autonomous centers of power, vulnerable to exploitation as a terrorist safe haven or as a potential staging ground for terrorist operations in Europe. Nevertheless, there were notable signs of increased local operational capability to combat terrorism and terrorism finance. (US State Department, 2006).

Bosnian society remains highly polarized between ethnic (e.g. religious) groups, and as of late 2007, was in the midst of the most serious political crisis since the Dayton Peace Accords (AKI, 2007; BBC 2007). Bosnian Islamists remain dominant in the central and federation government, as illustrated in the extraordinary example of the United Nation’s High Representative being forced to warn the Bosnian Security Minister Tarik Sadovic (SDA) that he would be removed from his position for not

upholding Bosnian law – sign deportation orders for residual mujahedin whose citizenships were removed by the Bosnian citizenship review committee (Alic, 2007; AKI, 2007). The borders remain porous, and crime and corruption remain a consistent problem (Schindler, 312). Among the unique factors that make Bosnia an attractive ‘forward operating base’ for al Qaida is the ready supply of weapons and explosives – including military grade weapons and explosives – as well as hundreds - if not thousands - of experienced operatives in place to utilize such weapons or facilitate their relocation to operators in Western Europe (Schindler, 311-313).

In an example of the implications for future al Qaida operations, a terrorist cell seeking to attack Western interests has already tapped into this pre-positioned network of Islamic extremists and weapons. In October 2005 the Bosnian police raided a house in the Sarajevo suburb of Butmir (100 meters from where NATO and EU Forces maintain their headquarters) and arrested two suspected terrorist operatives (US Department of State, 2005 and 2006; Alic). One of the operatives, Mirsad Bektasevic, a Bosnian who had Swedish citizenship and was known by the moniker ‘Maximus,’ was connected to other Islamic extremists including the infamous ‘Irabbi007,’ Younis Tsouli, considered one of the foremost ‘cyber-jihadists’ (Alic, 2006). Bektasevic and his accomplice, an ethnic Turk of Danish citizenry, were arrested in possession of 30 Kilograms of explosives, a fully prepared suicide vest, multiple firearms, and video threatening Europe that more attacks would follow if they did not remove their forces from Iraq and Afghanistan (Alic, 2006; Bosnian State Court, 2007). These individuals – only one of whom was tied to Bosnia, but lived in Western Europe – were able to obtain everything they needed to conduct a successful terrorist attack. Their activities were facilitated by Bajro Ikanovic, a veteran of the el-mujahedin unit (Alic, 2006) Amir Bajric, and Senad Hasanovic (Bosnian State Court, 2007). All the defendants in this trial were convicted, but perhaps more importantly, the arrest and resulting investigation led to arrests in the UK, Denmark, Bangladesh, and the disruption of an attack in Canada (Alic, 2006).

The government of Izetbegovic was successful in defying the Dayton Peace Accords and provided safe haven to hundreds of residual mujahedin. These individuals and their local adherents successfully spread radical Salafism/Wahhabism throughout Bosnian society from 1992 to the present day. In spite of having no known following prior to the war, a poll conducted in Bosnia in 2006 indicated that between 3-13% of Bosnia’s Muslims currently support the ‘Wahhabi’ movement to various degrees (Sito-Sucic, 2006). While the growing following within Bosnia has been addressed by some leaders within the Bosnian Islamic Community (hereafter referred to by its Bosnian acronym IZ – Islamska Zajednica), the IZ and its leadership have proven to be at minimum unwilling to curtail Islamic extremism; however, their conduct at times borders on willing enablers of Islamic extremism.

In November 2006, a well respected Sufi scholar, Professor Resid Hafizovic of the University of Sarajevo, received widespread media coverage when he identified Salafism/Wahhabism as ‘a virus that has infected the Bosnian media, administration, and religious institutions’ and called upon the IZ to ‘take responsibility for the damage they are causing in the country’ (Schwartz, 2006). Despite the public concern which led to Hafizovic’s authoring of the statement, and public examination of this issue, the IZ, and its leader, Reis Ulema Dr. Mustafa Ceric, remains less than pro-active in combating the assault upon Bosnia’s moderate Hanafin tradition or even reacting to serious incidents. While Ceric did condemn the 2002 Christmas eve murders, and issued warnings to Bosnians to ‘stay away from superstition, false books, and teachers who do not want to understand the authentic life in our homeland’ (Karajkov, 2006) he did not publicly specify the AIO or the foreign Islamist NGOs as the intuitions spreading such teaching; nor did he either call for or take action to constrict their ability to operate. Ceric has not only failed to publicly denounce the AIO, but has given interviews in their bi-weekly magazine ‘Saff’ (Karajkov, 2006). Beyond lending legitimacy to the AIO by granting interviews in their magazine, Ceric has pandered to the AIO by rejecting the notion that AIO should not be considered part of the Islamic Community (Karajkov, 2006). Despite the threat posed by the growth of radicalism, Ceric has displayed a duplicitous history on the issue, attacking radicalism only when absolutely necessary – even then only half-heartedly. In 2006, in response to several incidents in

which Bosnian ‘wahhabi’ adherents engaged in violent or disruptive behavior, the IZ issued guidelines for the practice of Islam within Bosnia (Bosnian Islamic Community, 2006). While these guidelines were clearly directed at the practitioners of Wahhabism/Salafism, the guidelines neither directly named organizations such as AIO as problematic, nor did it specifically identify Wahhabism/Salafism as the issue under discussion. By contrast, Cerić and the IZ had shown no such hesitation or diplomacy in attacking a Bosnian Islamic scholar who dared to speak candidly about the issue. The IZ issued a stunning rebuke of Professor Resid Hafizovic for his characterization of the threat and nature of Wahhabism/Salafism and chose to deflect the issue of Islamic extremism by raising the specter of the genocide at Srebrenica during the 1992-1995 Civil War (Bosnian Islamic Community, 2006). A former member of the Wahhabist movement – Jasmin Merdan has described the IZ’s failure to proactively combat the Wahhabist/Salafist assault upon Bosnian Islamic tradition as a force multiplier for those seeking to spread Islamic extremism (Moore, 2006). Perhaps most illustrative of Cerić’s true nature is his continued support for the presence of residual mujahedin in Bosnia. Rather than stand with the majority of Bosnian Muslims who do not support the continued presence of these foreign fighters, nor with the Bosniak leaders who established the CRC, Cerić described the situation by stating, ‘They are being expelled because they’re Arabs, because they’re Muslims, and they came here to help us’ (BBC, 2007). This statement is less shocking when one considers the fact that during the Bosnia war Cerić traveled throughout the Islamic world encouraging mujahedin participation in the conflict (Schindler, 130); or his explanation that the mujahedin had been invited to Bosnia in response to ‘Western betrayal’ (Schindler, 121).

While the Bosnian government established the CRC, the reluctance of the Bosnian Security Minister to deport those stripped of citizenship is illustrative of the continued governmental and societal support for radical Islamists; which acts as a force multiplier for al Qaida and other terrorist organizations. As illustrated by the cases of Tahirovic, Zulum, Bektasevic, Cosic, and the yet as identified Bosnian jihadists in Iraq (covered in AIO’s ‘Saff’ magazine), al Qaida’s call to jihad outside of Bosnia is being heard by Bosniaks. As Bosniaks make up sizeable diaspora populations in Western Europe and the United States (As of March 2007 there were as many as 150,000 Bosnian refugees in the United States), this poses unique security challenges for Western governments, as Bosnian operatives can easily blend into European or Anglo-Saxon communities, unlike operatives from Africa, the Middle East, or Asia. In the United States, the AIO affiliated group Udruzenje Muslimana Sjeverne Amerike (UMSA) is known to spread radicalism among the diaspora in the US and Canada (Deliso, 26). If even one percent of the 150,000 Bosnian refugees living in the United States agree with the Kosovar Albanian<sup>2</sup> refugees who plotted to attack US troops in New Jersey (Kociniewski, 2007), this gives counter-terrorism officials a pool of at least 1,500 operatives to track.

Finally, as older members of al Qaida continue to be captured and killed, veterans of al Qaida’s campaign in Bosnia will continue to assume higher status positions within the organization. As these veterans of Bosnia look to conduct further operations, they will likely seek assistance from their network that remains in place within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The continued importance of Bosnia to al Qaida was captured in a letter from Ayman Al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who stated:

As for the battles that are going on in the far-flung regions of the Islamic world, such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bosnia, they are just the ground word and the vanguard for the major battles which have begun in the heart of the Islamic world (Schindler, 9).

As part of the grand Islamic state they envision (The Caliphate), Bosnia remains a subject of interest for al Qaida, and the Dayton Peace Accords which ended the war and remain a sensitive subject within the radical Islamist world, as illustrated by the comment of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who warned Jihadist that ‘the Crusaders are preparing for the new “Dayton” conspiracy’ by forming an alliance with the fools amongst the Sunnis’ (Kohlmann, 2005), thereby illustrating that, to al Qaida, the

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<sup>2</sup> Active Islamic Youth members are known to be closely related to Islamists in Kosovo as well as other Balkan republics (Deliso, 66-67)

Dayton Peace Accords remain something to overturn in order to bring the Islamic state of Bosnia into the Caliphate.

## **Recommendations**

The optic of US and EU forces rushing to ‘declare success’ and withdraw from Bosnia at the same time that Bosnia is undergoing its worst political crisis since the end of the war gives al Qaida and its fellow travelers a PR victory, in that it shows that they are committed to Bosnia while the west is not. Maintaining at least a token presence with a US Flag officer in charge of NATO Headquarters Sarajevo is critical to countering this optic. It will help to reassure Bosnia’s Muslims that they will not be abandoned to their fate, and Bosnia need not rely upon the forces of al Qaida and the global Islamic insurgency as their guarantor of security.

Finally, all NGOs, organizations, and individuals that aid the forces of the global Islamic insurgency need to be robustly targeted and shut down. The use of name changes or hiding behind orphanages must not be allowed to cause even a brief suspense in pressure. This includes either the deportation or, if necessary, wide scale ‘rendition’ of members of the residual mujahedin community whose 30 days to withdraw from Bosnia have long since expired. If explained to the Bosnian public that the international community will not longer allow the majority of Bosnia’s citizens to be held hostage to these individuals, and that their expulsion will result in easing of travel restriction (a major complaint among Bosnia’s citizens) for those wishing to travel and work abroad, it may be seen in a positive light. If the issue of mujahedin is directly tied to the average Bosnian Muslims inability to travel, the population may turn further negative attention towards the residual mujahedin.

According to the report cited above, between 3-13% of the Bosnian Muslim population is known to support the ‘Wahhabist’ movement, thus, a majority of the populace does not support radical Islam. Rather than the current ‘top down’ method of providing assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina – a society rife with governmental corruption, - the US should consider aiming for the average citizens by providing aid and educational opportunities and force Islamist NGOs to spend more time winning recruits. The forces of moderation could be strengthened if the West provided a series of targeted aid packages coupled with measures aimed at isolating, removing or, when necessary, eliminating those known to sympathize with the Islamist world view.

Efforts to punish the elites who either support or by omission enable the forces of radicalism would be less apt to be seen as ‘punishing all Muslims’ if it is clear that the US and other Western nations are going to provide assistance that their Islamist leaders have been unwilling to provide. This includes pressuring or removing so-called ‘moderate’ members of the Bosnian Islamic community (IZ) who are in fact Islamists or Islamic extremists. As noted by insurgency expert Bard E. O’Neill, part of a popular revolt strategy is based ‘not only upon ideology but addressing material grievances’ (O’Neill, 51). Thus, with the majority of the population seeking Western integration and opposing radicalism, the potential for Western countries to marginalize the ruling Islamists/Nationalists parties exists. As the UN’s High Representative has the power to impose laws and remove any government or public official from their position, there can be no excuse for allowing those who abet terrorism/extremism to remain in their positions. This would empower the voices of moderation within the country and ultimately enable the Bosnian people to police their own country with greater efficiency; enabling the West to take a less active role. The term ‘long war’ is often used to describe the Global War on Terror; this description applies to Bosnia as the Islamists have long term goals that will need to be checked over time. While the temptation to ‘declare success’ or ‘mission accomplished’ is very alluring, the situation will only degrade further should this occur.

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